their own aspect of the meaning of things. On the other hand, the mere part, causation, will never appear in our account as the source of the whole; nor will this causation, which is but a very special form of Being, or a name for various special forms of Being, ever appear as that to which either the Being, or the wholeness of the meaning of the world, is due. And so much, then, for the mere causal efficacy, either of God or of man.
In consequence of these considerations, our primary
question in regard to the finite human individual, in his
relation to the divine life, is merely the question, In what
sense does the finite Being retain, despite the unity of the
whole divine life, any individual significance of his own,
and what is the relation of this finite significance to the
meaning and plan of the whole? But for the answer to
this, our really important question, we may now be
prepared, if we next lay new stress upon certain aspects of
the Fourth Conception of Being, to which we have made
repeated reference.
Ill
We have said that a meaning gets wholeness and individuality of expression precisely in so far as it gets, at the same time, conscious determination. An imperfect idea is vague. It is general. But it is so, in our own finite consciousness, in two senses. (1) Any finite idea, as we have seen, sends us to some other experience to furnish us yet further instances that are needed for its whole expression. This reference to another for the remainder of itself is characteristic of even the clearest and most precise of our finite ideas, just in so far as they are gen-
