selfish and lustful nature, and the other which appeals to his moral and relational nature—and he is the proper subject of the one or the other government, according to the character of his ruling affection or love.
Man, as a conscious being, can be governed only through some department of his consciousness. That which induces in him volition must address his perceptions, and proceed thence to his affections. For man's affections can not be approached externally except through his perception. This is most manifest to the reflecting mind. Before an individual can love or hate an object, he must be able to perceive it. And his love or hatred thereof will be according to his perceptions. Hence it will be perceived that the individual who is in the ruling love of self, if governed at all as a conscious being, must be governed by an appeal to his selfish nature; that is, by an appeal to his hopes and fears. For so long as he is not under the rule of his moral nature, he can not be governed by its influence. If man is to be controlled, he must be controlled by controlling that which controls him.
The selfish and lustful man is under the dominion of his selfish nature, and whatever controls that nature governs him. And he can be governed, as a lustful being, only by controlling his selfish nature. The same is true in principle of the moral man, or he who is under the dominion of his moral nature. Whatever controls the moral nature governs him; and so long as he is under the dominion of his moral nature he must be so governed. Thus it will be perceived that our proposition is true, that man, as a conscious being, must
