BATTLi: OF TIIK ALMA. 73 ions on the open plateau, hut he hvouglit the liead chap. of his Division to a point high up on the steep ' broken side of the liill, and extended it, in single and double battalion columns, on either side of the track by which he had ascended. He spread him- Tiiemurse liu takes. self more towards his left than towards his right, and did not move any of his battalions in such a way as to be able to give a hand to Bosquet. Prince Napoleon's Division hung back in the Pnnce valley, and the bulk of it at this time was still on Division. the north bank of the river. Although the head of Canrobert's Division, Firesus- ,. , 11-1 T-n- • ^ t.linctl 1»V benig under the heights on the liussian side oi the rear-' , *" . . ^ - , , ward ]inr- the river, was einovmg good shelter, the masses tionsof ' . , ' theFreiu'i of troops which stood more towards the rear, in- columns, eluding some of Canrobert's battalions and the great bulk of Prince Napoleon's Division, were exposed to the fire of the guns on the Telegraph Height. They suffered : and a feeliiiff of dis- Discourati; couragement began to spread. Marshal St Arnaud had understood the gravity of the danger which would result from any delay in the advance of his centre, but to meet it he used an ill-chosen safeguard. The way to send help to Bosquet was to give Canrobert due war- rant to move up at ones upon the plateau, whether with or without his artillery.* "What the ]Iar-
- If the objoctioi) to ailvancing on the plateau without artil-
lery was, according to Freneii ideas, insuperable, an eflort, one would think, should have been made to push forward Prince Napoleon's Division. Prince Napoleon had in his front two roads leading up to the Telegraph, and one of these, at the least, was practicable (and was afterwards used) for artillery.
