42 THE BATTLE OF BALACLAVA. CHAP. I. Defects in the subsidiary arrange- ments of the Allies should not be left dependent upon the result of persuasions addressed to an independent com- mander, more especially where the commander whose assent thus had to be gained was a man of a hesitating and anxious temperament. Independently of the inherent fault that there was in this outer line of defence, the subsidiary arrangements were far from being calculated to avert a disaster. One important omission was this : In all the works constituting this outer line, the Turkish soldiery were left without that strengthening help which might have been afforded them by the presence in each redoubt of one or two Eng- lishmen accustomed to rule Orientals ; and the want was in no way supplied by sending, instead, a non-commissioned officer of artillery.* Then, again, since the cavalry was much looked to as an arm to ward off for some time any llussian attack, it would have been well to avoid a sever- ance of authority by placing under one com- mander the whole of the forces, whether horse, or foot, or artillery, which were charged with the
- In the mere mechanical business of working a gun the
Turkish Topdji is likely to be quite as well skilled as an Eng- lish artilleryman. What is wanted for converting a herd of Turks into a formidable body of warriors is the presence of a resolute man or boy of a higher station in life, who will under- take to lead them. The singular power that can be exerted over a Turkish force by a dozen, by six, nay even by two young English officers is spoken of in the ' Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. ii. of Cabinet Edition, chap. xiii. Notwithstanding all that had been achieved in the defence of Silistria and on the field of Giurgevo, there was an entire neglect of the means which there produced such brilliant results.
