X CONTENTS. CHAPTER IV. OPEUATIONK ON GORTSCIIAKOFf's FRONT. 1. The part allotted to Prince Gortschakoff's corps, . . 42 II. His operations, ......... 43 The Grenadiers and the Scots Fusilier Guards not detained in his front, .......... 43 Rut led to Mount Inkerman, ....... 44 Colonel Upton's measures, ....... 44 Colonel Cadogan's niis.sion to Bosquet, ..... 44 The Coldstream also despatched to Mount Inkerman, . . 45 Bosquet's troops detained for a while by Gortschakoff's menaces, 45 And afterwards by the mistaken assurances of Brown and Cathcart, .......... 47 Bosquet's clear perception of the enemy's real purpose, . . 48 The reinforcements which Bosquet at intervals was able to bring to the field of Inkerman, ....... 48 The power of Sir Colin Campbell and Viuoy neutralised, . 49 III. Circumstances under which Gortschakoff's force became para- lysed, 49 CHAPTEE V. OPERATIONS ON THE SEBASTOPOL FRONT. I. The garrison forces before 9.30 A.M., ..... 51 Canrobert's endeavour to draw reinforcements for Inkerman from his siege-corps, ........ 51 Troops remaining with Forey at 9. 30 A.M., .... 52
