CONTENTS. XXXVll CllArTER VriT. — roiilhnml. Real extont of tlu^ ailvmitagc possessed liy tlic A.llies in iioint of arms, . . . . ' . . . . . . 483 Causes tending to a<'e<)unt for the icsult of the fltclit, . . 485 The ground, 485 The mist, 485 The enemy's gross way of figliting, ..... 487 Quality of the English officers and men, .... 489 Magnitude of the results that might have followed a Russian victory at Inkerman, ........ 489 The Allies abstaining from any use of their victory as a means to a greater end, ........ 489 And even allowing themselves to be checked by tlio battle, . 491 One of the enemy's objects attained, ..... 491 Impression produced on the Allies by the enemy's exhil)itiou of numerical strength, ....... 492 Coimsel ollered by General Plvans, ...... 492 Lord Raglan's appreciation of the conditions under which lie must act, . 493 APPENDIX. Note I. — British Infantry which sooner or Liter was oc cup}'ing the Victoria Ridge on the 5th Nov, 1854 Note II. — Strength of 2d Division present at Battle of Inker man under General Pennefather, Note III. — Russian Forces engaged in Field Operations dur ing the Battle of Inkerman, Note IV. — The Allied Forces which sooner or later were present on Mount Inkerman the Day of the Battle, 500 495 496 497
