SEQUEL TO INKEIJMAN NARRATIVE. 473 undertakincf early morn was the most fitting chap. VIII tmie, and some two or three hours after midnight L. they received a vague warning in the low, distant sound of wheels reported by Sargent and Morgan, followed up before long by the pealing of the Sebastopol bells. And again it is true that with a moderate addition to the force which performed and supported the outpost duty, or even without such addition — though in that case at a risk of incurring occasional vexatious losses — the pickets might have been so placed as to be capable of giving an earlier notice of any attack on Mount Inkerman than the adopted system could ensure ; and even indeed without all that hazard, the object might have been partly attained by causing the outlying pickets to patrol to the front every morning a little before break of day.* On the whole, it was certainly possible that by a keener attention to dubious signs, and an altered disposi- tion of their outpost system, our people might have accelerated their discovery of the coming attack. The machinery of Pennefather's outpost system was not ' set ' in such way as to make it detect the enemy in the act of ascending Mount Inker- man; but for the purposes of its more limited task the instrument worked with as much ac- curacy as the dimness of the air would allow. Before the first shot was fired, the main body of the second division had duly stood to their arms. being perceived by the pickets of the 2d Division. Still, no one thought, I believe, that Evans, who then commanded the 2d Division, was 'surprised.' This Peunefather himself frankly said to nie.
