22 THE BAri'LE OF INKERMAN. CHAP, within the lines of Sebastopol would not only ^^- touch by its left the right rear of Danneuherg's troops, but also act under orders which assigned it for the day distinctly aggressive tasks instead of mere garrison duties, and linked it to the army outside by the bond of a common purpose. So regarded, General Mbller (who commanded in the place) would be adding to the 62,000 men under Gortschakoff and Dannenberg the whole power of the garrison, thus bringing the united array to a strength of full 100,000, and extending the front of battle to a length of about twelve miles.* If at first it seem strange that the garrison holding a fortress should be made to form part of a line of battle, and have to combat accord- ingly alongside of the relieving army, it will be remembered in the next moment that the Allies were the original innovators, and that by undertaking to besiege Sebastopol without hav-
- 111 putting the above force at 'full 100,000' I believe that
I have kept a good way within bounds ; for, there being only a small number of men on the north side, and only 3862 on the Baktchi Serai road, it is difficult to see Iiow any deduction much exceeding 10,000 could fairly be made from the 120,000, and under that aspect the Russian force arrayed for the general engagement would be 110,000 — i.e., 10,000 more than I have stated it Even the excepted forces were, in a sense, taking part ; and considering how easily and rapidly the enemy moved troops across the roadstead, I should hardly have erred if I had included his troops on the north side as men capable of taking a part in the battle, and accordingly in that sense ' present. '
