Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol 7.djvu/467

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APPENDIX. 423 seems to result that theru was no special mishap, or default, or neglect, and that practically, in the judgment of the Ordnance authorities, the execution of the order could not have been accelerated ! NoTK 4. — Contracts for the supply of an army in the field are so apt to be broken, that the Commissary-General no doubt knew he must be prepared for such contingencies (sec Sir Randolph Routh's ' Observations on Commissariat Service,' p. 24) ; and he seems to have always aimed at keeping up margins sufficient to prevent his being straitened by such defaults. Note 5. — The Prince Consort himself stated this to an English traveller high in my confidence. Note 6. — The sums paid for ' demurrage ' were very great. Note 7. — I have before me the official correspondence on this mournful subject. It was only after a lengthened correspondence that Lord Raglan said the matter must drop. Note 8. — Mr Filder's address to the Chelsea Board, Rep., p. .360. Even during the autumn period — October and the early days of November — when beasts were sent by sailing-vessels, they perished in the proportion of more than one-third. — Ibid, Note 9. — Ibid. Note 10. — Guns and waggons ascending from the French ports to their camp had at first to climb some rather steep ground, but passed thenceforth over open downs where, by deviating from the accustomed track, a soft bit of road could be easily exchanged for a better one. Note 11. — To understand the defenceless state of the place, see vol. iv. of Cabinet Edition, chap, vi., sect. 6 et seq. Lord Raglan in person had caught Prince Mentschikoff's army in the very act of deserting Sebastopol ; and he saw, to use his own expression, that by the sudden march of the Allies to the ' South ' Side,' the garrison had been ' completely taken aback.' Note 12. — See ante, vol. iv. of Cabinet Edition, chap. viL Note 13. — For unless he had become so assui-ed, it is hardly imaginable that — at all events, without a great struggle — he would have consented to exchange the opportunity of at once breaking into Sebastopol for a prospect so wretched as that of