BETWEEN THE CZAll AND THE SULTAN. 185 will be likely to seem wise and moderate, and chap. .XI deserving of a complete approval ; but if a states- 1_ man goes on approving and approving one by one a long series of papers of this sort, without rousing himself to the effort of taking a broader view of the transactions which lie has separately examined, he may find himself entangled in a course of action which he never intended to adopt. Perhaps this view tends to explain the reasons which caused a Minister whose love of peace was passionate and almost fanatical to become gradually and imper- ceptibly responsible for a policy leading towards war.* Lord Aberdeen did not formally renounce his neutral policy of 1828, and he did not at this time advise the Queen to conclude any treaty for the defence of Turkey, nor ask the judgment of Parliament upon the expediency of taking such a course ; but day after day, and week after week, the Cabinet-boxes came and went, and came and
- This may also explain how it was that, so far as is known,
the ceaseless efforts of the Prince Consort to exert an influence upon our foreign policy were without advantageous results. He never, as he complained with great naivete, could find any question 'intact'; and if he had been an English statesman accustomed to apprehend the way in 'which an English policy grows up to maturity, he would not have dreamed of being able to do go. In order that the suggestions of a Palace adviser should have effect upon the swift course of business in our Foreign Office, it was, of course, indispensable that they should be opportune ; and that condition apparently the Prince Con- sort did not fulfil. His Memorandum of the 21st of October 1853, if submitted to Ministers at all, should have been sub- mitted to them at the latest on the 31st of the previous May, anil before the messenger started who carried the despatch of that date.
