ture conſequently that will find a compenſation in futurity, for any ſeeming inequality in his deſtiny here; but the creatures of a poetical creator, are imaginary, and tranſitory; they have no longer duration than the repreſentation of their reſpective fables, and conſequently if they offend, they muſt be puniſhed during that repreſentation, and therefore we are very far from pretending, that poetical juſtice is an equal repreſentation of the juſtice of the Almighty.’ In ſupport of this opinion our critic produces the example of Euripides, and the beſt poets amongſt the ancients, who practiſed it, and the authority of Ariſtotle, who eſtabliſhed the rule. But nature, or Shakeſpear, which is another word for nature, is by no means in favour of this equal diſtribution. No character can be repreſented in tragedy abſolutely perfect, as no ſuch character exiſts; but a character which poſſeſſes more virtues than vices, may be upon the whole amiable, and yet with the ſtricteſt propriety may be made the chief ſufferer in the drama. If any paſſion ſtrongly predominates in the heart of man, it will often expoſe him to ſuch ſnares, entangle him in ſuch difficulties, and oppreſs him with ſuch wants, that in the very nature of things, he muſt ſink under the complicated weight of miſery. This may happen to a character extremely amiable, the paſſion which governs him may be termed unhappy, but not guilty, or if it ſhould partake the nature of guilt, fallible creatures cannot always combat with ſucceſs againſt guilty paſſions.
The drama being an imitation of nature, the poet cauſes a compoſition of characters formed in his imagination to be repreſented by players; theſe characters charm, or diſpleaſe, not only for what they do; during the repreſentation of the fable, but we love, or hate them for what they have done before their appearance; and we dread, or
