as any man, the civil conſtitution of the kingdom, which indeed was his chief ſtudy.
In the firſt volume of his works there is a proſe eſſay, which he entitles The Original Power of the Collective Body of the People of England, Examined and Aſſerted; this was intended to refute a very ridiculous opinion, which politicians, more zealous than wiſe, had induſtriouſly propagated, viz. ‘That the repreſentatives of the people, i. e. the Houſe of Commons had a right to enact whatever laws, and enter into whatever meaſures they pleaſe, without any dependence on, or even conſulting the opinion of, their conſtituents; and that the collective body of the people have no right to call them to an account, or to take any cognizance of their conduct.’ In anſwer to which Mr. De Foe very ſenſibly obſerves, ‘that it is poſſible for even a Houſe of Commons to be in the wrong. They may be miſled by factions and parties, and it is as ridiculous to ſuppoſe them infallible, as to ſuppoſe the Pope of Rome, or the Popiſh conclave infallible, which have more than once determined againſt one another. It is poſſible (ſays he) for them to be bribed by penſions and places, and by either of thoſe extremes to betray their truſt, and abuſe the people who entruſt them; and if the people ſhould have no redreſs in ſuch a caſe, then would the nation be in hazard of being ruined by their own repreſentatives. And it is a wonder to find it aſſerted in a certain treatiſe, That it is not to be ſuppoſed, that ever the Houſe of Commons can injure the people who entruſt them. There can be no better way to demonſtrate the poſſibility of a thing, than by proving that it has been already; and we need go no further back than to the reign of King Charles II. in which we have ſeen liſts of 180 members, who received private penſions from the
