historical or physical explanation, in the customs which he subjects to analysis. The rational attitude, however, is unmistakable, and these introductory remarks, personal as they may be to the priestess Clea, and detached from the main body of the work, yet stand in a true harmony with what we shall hereafter see to be its essential purpose, to show, namely, that while Philosophy can grasp the Highest without the intervention of myth or institution, it can also aid a pure conception of the Highest by studying the myths and institutions which foreign peoples have discovered and created as intermediaries betwixt themselves and the Highest.
But in spite of the important part thus assigned to Reason in settling disputed matters of faith, and arbitrating on points of national and individual ethics, Plutarch makes it clear that Piety and Patriotism have claims in this matter which are actually enforced by Reason in her selecting and purifying rôle. If he had seen, as his age could not see, and as we can see, that Reason can only be the Mystagogue to Religion in a very limited degree, he would probably have been patriot first and philosopher afterwards, or would, perhaps, have accepted the compromise of Cotta, and played each part in turn as public or private necessities dictated. But the crux does not arise, and Plutarch's position never really has the inconsistency which, carelessly considered, it appears to have, because he is honestly convinced that what Reason rejects in the national faith, it is good for the national faith that it should be deprived of. Hence it is possible to
