to opposite species of a common genus.[1] These two conditions are the only ones required.[2] Thus far Aristotle has been faithfully followed. But in the details of the actual process of assimilation, Bacon seeks to give what Aristotle omitted.
Bacon’s preliminary description of this process is as follows.[3] We have before us, let us say, two objects each with a specific nature of its own; the one is Agent and the other is Patient, and the former is to transform the latter into a thing like itself. This transformation will be effected through the Species. Now, at first the Species is an incomplete effect of the Agent, and for that very reason is called just species; in fact, the only reason for the Species at all is its service in mediating the assimilation.[4] During this early stage of the process the Patient is in process of being assimilated to the Agent, but is retentive of its own specific nature. But there comes a time when the Agent, through its Species, has prevailed over the Patient; and this is the moment when the specific nature of the Patient has been destroyed, and the Agent has induced the complete Effect. And when this moment arrives, the effect of the Agent ceases to be called Species and is called by the name of the Agent itself.
To illustrate, by a very concrete case, Bacon takes the action of fire upon wood. At first the passive wood is called wood and the active fire called fire, while the process is incomplete; and that is while the process of assimilation is being carried on, through a certain something with incomeplete being, the Species. But there comes a point at which the fire has prevailed over the wood, and then the Species issues with a new name, fire. The Specific nature of wood has given way to that of fire, through the mediation of the Species; the first and incomplete effect of the fire issues then under the name of a complete effect, or fire. So fire produces fire through incomplete fire. In short, a complete Effect just like its cause is produced through the medium of the incomplete effect, or Species; and the Species is the kind of intermediary that can be identical first with the Agent and then with the supplanted Patient, or Complete Effect.
This is Bacon’s preliminary account of the process. Its clearness in certain particulars makes only more annoying its confusion in other respects. The further study of details that follows will make the matter clearer. But, as we shall see, Bacon is here and
- ↑ Bacon omits to take up this condition systematically (however, see C. N. 16), but he thinks of it as equally important. See, e.g., II—422ff., 446ff., 518ff., 544ff. Br. 363ff.
- ↑ See II—443. This is then in agreement with Aristotle.
- ↑ See II—414ff. cf. C. N. 20. For Aristotle see Zeller ibid. 315ff.
- ↑ See C. N. 20.
to the Agent. See Zeller ibid. 419. Bacon treats the Agent as a whole, and explains in detail the change in the Patient, v. infra.
