Title 3--The President lateral drug control agreements. The GCOB places a high priority on com- bating drug transshipments through its archipelago and works closely with the USG on Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos (OPBAT). The USG looks forward to assisting The Bahamas to improve its maritime end-game capability, without which sustained drug interdiction, arrest and convic- tion of traffickers, and the forfeiting of their assets is improbable. Given the volume of commercial shipping through The Bahamas, the GCOB needs to rigorously implement its chemical control laws to prevent illegal diversion of precursor and essential chemicals. Bahamian authorities continue monitoring bank compliance and inves- tigating suspicious financial transactions under the 1996 money laundering law. Increased supervision of the offshore banking sector and training of all financial sector employees, however, will be necessary in order to increase the number of suspicious activity reports, which is still very small given the size of The Bahamas financial services sector. Despite several public statements of commitment, the GCOB has not established a financial intel- ligence unit (FIU) or to seek membership in the Egmont Group. In 1999, the GCOB passed legislation which allows designation of the United States under Bahamian asset forfeiture laws, based on reciprocity. This will allow Bahamian courts to enforce U.S. forfeiture orders in many cases. The GCOB took further steps in \177999 to strengthen its judicial system, with USG assistance. Despite these efforts, no major Bahamian drug traf- ficker has been convicted in The Bahamas and sent to prison, due largely to continuing delays in the courts. In addition, weak bail laws allow ar- rested drug traffickers to obtain bail and continue transshipping drugs while awaiting trail. Notwithstanding committed and talented judicial lead- ership, The Bahamas needs to improve the effectiveness of its court system and its Attorney General's office in gaining convictions against major drug traffickers. The Bahamas also needs to improve its responsiveness to U.S. requests under the mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) and to speed the processing of extradition cases. In October \177999, for the first time in recent history, a Bahamian law en- forcement official was assassinated, allegedly by Bahamian drug dealers in retaliation for his stand against a corrupt official or to prevent his testi- mony. The GCOB should ratify the Inter-American Convention against Cor- ruption and assure that corrupt public officials are effectively prosecuted. Finally, the GCOB needs to move quickly to complete and adopt a com- prehensive national drug strategy containing goals and objectives as well as measures of effectiveness. Bolivia Exceeding the schedule of its own five year plan to eliminate all illicit coca from Bolivia, in \177999 the Banzer administration eradicated an unprec- edented \1776,999 hectares of coca, for a net reduction of 43 percent. Although Bolivia remains the world's third largest producer of cocaine, with the ability to produce a potential 70 metric tons, Bolivian cocaine be- came less marketable in 1999 due to a very successful law enforcement ef- fort to prevent precursor chemicals from being smuggled in from neigh- boring countries. As a result of significant law enforcement pressure, Boliv- ian cocaine producers were forced to use less efficient means of processing with substitute or recycled chemicals, and cutting agents, such as manitol. The purity of finished Bolivian cocaine hydrochloride (HC1) dropped to as 36O
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