Other Presidential Documents However, Haiti failed to take many other significant counterdrug actions. These actions can be categorized into the areas of anti-corruption, anti- money laundering, law enforcement, prosecution, and international co- operation: the GOH did not deposit an instrument of ratification of the OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption; introduce anti-corrup- tion legislation; prosecute drug-related public (including police) corruption; put into force the anti-money laundering law passed in January 2001; en- force existing anti-money laundering guidelines issued by the Central Bank; require cross-border currency declarations and provide penalties for non- compliance; increase the number of arrests of maior traffickers; increase the size of the antidrug squad (BLTS) to 75 officers; establish a permanent BLTS office outside Port au Prince; take steps to ensure the integrity of the BLTS; provide training to iudges, prosecutors, and law enforcement offi- cials; waive Haiti's primary right to exercise prosecutorial iurisdiction over non-Haitian flag vessels interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard in Haitian wa- ters; or put into force the 1997 U.S.-Haiti Bilateral Maritime Counter- narcotics Interdiction Agreement. The GOH did not sign a counterdrug Let- ter of Agreement with the United States Government. Despite Haiti's demonstrable failure on counternarcotics issues, U.S. vital national interests require that U.S. assistance to Haiti continue. Because Haiti is the hemisphere's poorest country, there is need for continued as- sistance to programs that alleviate hunger, increase access to education, combat environmental degradation, fight the spread of HIV/AIDS, and fos- ter the development of civil society. These programs create an environment conductive to building democracy and reducing illegal migration. They also address the root causes of poverty and hopelessness in Haiti, which are im- portant contributing factors behind Haitian involvement in the drug trade. Additionally, suspension of assistance to Haiti would result in the further deterioration of Haitian institutions essential to combat increasing crimi- nality. Notice of February 26, 2002 Continuation of the National Emer\365ency Relatin\365 to Cuba and of the Emer\365ency Authority Relatin\365 to the Re\365ulation of the Anchora\365e and Movement of Vessels On March \177, \177996, by Proclamation 6867, President Clinton declared a na- tional emergency to address the disturbance or threatened disturbance of international relations caused by the February 24, \177996, destruction by the Government of Cuba of two unarmed U.S.-registered civilian aircraft in international airspace north of Cuba. In July \177996 and on subsequent occa- sions, the Government of Cuba stated its intent to forcefully defend its sov- ereignty against any U.S.-registered vessels or aircraft that might enter Cuban territorial waters or airspace while involved in a flotilla and peace- ful protest. Since these events, the Government of Cuba has not dem- onstrated that it will refrain from the future use of reckless and excessive force against U.S. vessels or aircraft that may engage in memorial activities or peaceful protest north of Cuba. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am con- 283
�
