Page:Treatise of Human Nature (1888).djvu/721

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A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE.

the idea and they are only probable, 73; the discovery of causation the special work of reasoning, for it is the only relation of its class which can be traced beyond our senses and informs us of existences and objects which we do not see or feel, 74 (cf. 103); causation a natural as well as a philosophical relation, 15, 94 (v. Cause, §§ 2, 3); property a very close relation, 309, 310; animals incapable of relations of property and right, 326; but relation of ideas and impressions exists for animals, who show 'an evident judgment' of causation, 327.

D. Contiguity, resemblance, and causation not only transport the mind from the impression to the idea but also convey the vivacity of the former to the latter, 98 f. (v. Sympathy); only causation a source of belief, 107; resemblance employed in all arguments from cause and effect, 142; exact resemblance of the present object to one of the two constantly conjoined objects necessary to arguments from cause and effect, 153; also resemblance of all past instances to one another, 163 f. (v. Cause, § 7 C, § 9 B).

§ 2. Ideas related by contiguity, causation, and resemblance, impressions only by resemblance, 283, 343 (cf. 381); double relation of impressions and ideas, 286, 381 (v. Pride); of ideas opposed in direction to that of impressions, 339; identity (q.v.) produces a stronger relation than the most perfect resemblance, 341; relation of ideas forwards that of impressions, since its absence alone is able to prevent it, 380; one impression may be related to another not only where their sensations are resembling, but also where their impulses or directions are similar or correspondent, 381; thus pity which is painful is related to benevolence which is pleasant, 382, 384; parallel direction of desires is a 'real relation,' 394; a transition of passions may arise either from a double relation of impressions and ideas or a conformity in direction and tendency of any two desires, 385; double relation of impressions and ideas only necessary to production of a passion not to its transformation into another, 420; the predominant passion swallows up the inferior even without any relation, 419; of ideas, explains mixture of grief and joy in hope and fear, 443.

§ 3. vice and virtue not relations, 463 f.; if they are any of the demonstrable relations, then inanimate objects are virtuous and vicious, since they are susceptible of these relations, 464; to say that reason discovers such an action in such relations to be virtuous does not make virtue a relation, 464 n.; if they are relations, these relations must be solely between external objects and internal actions: but there are no such peculiar relations, 465; thus all the relations which we discover in ingratitude between men are found between inanimate objects, and those of incest between animals, 466-7; even if there were such relations it would be im-