This menace to the British Empire was no more serious than another which was frankly espoused by certain supporters of the Bagdad plan—the possibility, even without a preponderance of naval power, of severing the communications of the empire in time of war. Dr. Rohrbach, for example, put it this way: "If it comes to war with England, it will be for Germany simply a question of life and death. The possibility that events may turn out favorably for us depends wholly and solely upon whether we can succeed in putting England herself in a precarious position. That cannot be done by a direct attack in the North Sea; all idea of invading England is purely chimerical. We must, therefore, seek other means which will enable us to strike England in a vulnerable spot. . . . England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe in only one place—Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean not only the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal and of her communications with India and the Far East, but would probably entail, also, the loss of her possessions in Central and East Africa. We can never dream, however, of attacking Egypt until Turkey is mistress of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the extension of the Anatolian Railway to Bagdad, she is in a position to withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia. . . . The stronger Turkey grows the more dangerous does she become for England."[15]
It is only fair to add, however, that Dr. Rohrbach was not an authorized spokesman of the German people, the German Government, or the Bagdad Railway Company. His views were personal and are to be given weight only in so far as they influenced or reflected public opinion in Germany; to estimate their importance by such a standard is no simple task. But whatever its true significance, Dr. Rohrbach's interest in the Bagdad Railway was certainly
