Bonds of religion and race enlisted Russian sympathy in the struggle of the Balkan states to win independence from Turkey—a cause which harmonized with the Russian ambition to bring about the disintegration of Turkey-in-Europe. The rise of German influence at Constantinople—of which the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway concessions were a tangible manifestation—had been a source of annoyance to Russia, not only because it prevented Russian domination of Turkish affairs and because it strengthened the position of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, but also because it tended to strengthen Turkish military power. It was annoying enough to witness the rising political and economic power of Germany in the Near East; it was more annoying to realize that, under German guidance, the Turks might experience an economic and military renaissance which would end once and for all the Russian hope of possessing ancient Byzantium.
Strategically the construction of the Bagdad Railway was a real menace to Russian ambitions in the Near East. The completion of the line would enable the Ottoman Government to effect a prompt mobilization along the Armenian front. For example, the Fifth Turkish Army Corps, from Damascus, and the Sixth Corps, from Bagdad—which in the War of 1877 arrived on the field after a series of forced marches, minus a large number of its effectives, too late to save Kars or to raise the siege of Erzerum—could be brought quickly by rail from Syria and Mesopotamia to Angora for the defence of northern Anatolia. In the event of a Russo-Turkish war such a maneuver would render extremely precarious a Russian invasion of Armenia or a Russian advance on Constantinople along the south shore of the Black Sea. In a general European war in which both Russia and Turkey might be involved the existence of this railway line would make possible a Turkish stroke at the southern frontier
