of accuracy the influence which the Bagdad Railway exerted upon British imperialists in the final determination to reach an agreement with France. One may agree with an eminent French authority, however, that "neither in England nor in France is the principle of the understanding to be sought. Rather was it the fear of Germany which determined England—not only her King and Government, but the whole of her people—to draw nearer France."[38] British fear and dislike of Germany were founded upon the phenomenal growth of German industry and overseas commerce, the rapid expansion of the German mercantile marine, the construction of the German navy, and the insistence of German diplomatists that Germany be not ignored in colonial matters. The Bagdad Railway did nothing to quiet those fears. It served, rather, to render precarious Britain's position in the East.
In March, 1903, when the definitive Bagdad Railway concession was granted, British imperial affairs were in a far from satisfactory state. The termination of the Boer War had ended the fear that the British Empire might lose its hold on South Africa, but the sharp criticism of British conduct toward the Boers—criticism which came not only from abroad, but from malcontents at home—had dealt a severe blow to British prestige. The relentless advance of Russia in China, Persia, and Afghanistan gave cause for anxiety as to the safety of Britain's possessions in the Middle and Far East. And although France had withdrawn gracefully from the Fashoda affair, it was by no means certain that Egypt had seen the last of French interference. Added to all of these difficulties was the proposed German-owned railway from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf, flanking the Suez Canal and reaching out to the back door of India.
Under such circumstances it was small wonder that Great Britain took stock of her foreign policies. The
