interference in Cretan affairs and British support of the insolent Sheik of Koweit still further complicated the situation.[7]
For Germany, on the other hand, Turkish nationalism held no menace. So far from desiring a weak Turkey—as did most of the other European Powers—her policy in the Near East was based upon the strengthening of Turkey. If Turkey was to be strong, she must suppress dissentient nationalist and religious minorities; therefore Germany raised no voice of protest against the Armenian and Macedonian atrocities. If Turkey sought to recover territories which formerly had acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan, Germany had nothing to fear; the Kaiser ruled over no such territories. If Turkey chose to arouse the Moslem world by a Pan-Islamic revival, that was no concern of Germany; the German Empire had a comparatively insignificant number of Mohammedan subjects. If the Turkish program discomfited the Entente Powers, that was to Germany's advantage in the great game of world politics; therefore Germany could afford to support the Young Turk Government. As in the days of Abdul Hamid, Germany appeared to be the only friend of the Ottomans.[8]
The improvement in the German political position at Constantinople was reflected in a changing Turkish attitude toward the Bagdad Railway. Among revolutionary leaders there was a growing realization of the great economic and political importance of railways and, particularly, of the Bagdad system. It became apparent upon examination, also, that others than Germans had obtained monopolistic concessions in the Ottoman Empire—in this respect the Lynch Brothers came in for a good deal of attention. The Ottoman General Staff—which had recalled General von der Goltz as chief military adviser—insisted that the early construction of a trans-Mesopotamian rail-
