Page:Turkey, the great powers, and the Bagdad Railway.djvu/67

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.

naval law of 1898, laying the foundation of a fleet that later was to challenge British supremacy of the seas. German diplomacy had developed interests in eastern Asia; it was developing interests on the seas and in western Asia; it had abandoned a purely Continental policy. No further signs were needed that a new era was dawning in German foreign affairs—unless, perhaps, it be mentioned that the great Prince Bismarck quietly passed away at Friedrichsruh on July 30 of that momentous year!


German Economic Interests Make for Near Eastern Imperialism

Bismarck's policy of aloofness in the Near East, however desirable it may have been from the political point of view, could not have appealed to those statesmen and soldiers and business men who believed that diplomatic policies should be determined in large part by the economic situation of the German Empire. The interest of William II in Turkey was enthusiastically supported by all those who sought to have German foreign affairs conducted with full recognition of the needs of industrialized Germany in raw materials and foodstuffs, of the importance of richer and more numerous foreign markets for the products of German factories, and of the exigencies of economic, as well as military, preparation for war. The great natural wealth of the Ottoman Empire in valuable raw materials, the possibilities of developing the Near East as a market for manufactured articles, and the geographical situation of Turkey all help to explain why the economic exploitation of the Sultan's dominions was a matter of more vital concern to Germany than to any other European power. To make this clear it will be necessary to digress, for a time, to consider the nature of the imperial problems of an industrial state and, in particular, the problems of industrial Germany.