than they were, they, alone, could not have solved the imperial problem of an industrialized Germany. German colonial trade was possessed of the same inherent weakness as German overseas commerce—it would be dependent, in the event of a general European war, upon British sea power. German industry could be effectually crippled by interruption of the flow of essential raw materials, such as cotton and copper, or by the cutting of communications with her foreign markets. It was questionable whether the German navy could be relied upon to keep the seas open.
Blockades, furthermore, exist not only in time of war, but in time of peace as well. European nations were surrounded by tariff barriers which seriously restricted the development of international trade and served to promote a system of national economic exclusiveness—a condition of affairs which harmonized only too well with the existing colossal military establishments. In this respect, of course, Germany was more sinner than sinned against. But in such an age it behooved every nation to build its industries, as well as its armies, with some view to the contingencies of war.
German statesmen and economists were by no means backward in understanding the situation. Although they had no disposition to overlook the development of the merchant marine and the navy, they believed this was not enough. They sought to build up in Central Europe a system of economic alliances, as they previously had effected a formidable military alliance. Thus might Germany and her allies become an economically self-sufficient unit, freed from dependence upon British sea power.[37] And into this alliance could be incorporated the Near East!
Beyond the Bosporus lay a country rich in oils and metals; a country capable of supplying German textile
