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records to indicate that the CIA held personnel accountable for the detention of individuals the CIA itself determined were wrongfully detained.[1]
On at least four occasions, the CIA used host country detention sites in Country to detain individuals on behalf of the CIA who did not meet the MON standard for capture and detention. ALEC Station officers at CIA Headquarters explicitly acknowledged that these detainees did not meet the MON standard for detention, and recommended placing the individuals in host country detention facilities because they did not meet the standard. The host country had no independent reason to detain these individuals and held them solely at the behest of the CIA.[2]
- B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
- 1. Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were "Counterproductive" and "Ineffective"; After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys Research Possible Legal Defense for Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA Conducts No Research on Effective Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No Relevant Experience
At the time of the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON—which, as noted, did not reference interrogation techniques—the CIA had in place long-standing formal standards for conducting interrogations. The CIA had shared these standards with the
- ↑ The CIA's June 2013 Response "acknowledge[s] that there were cases in which errors were made," but points only to the case of Khalid al-Masri, whose wrongful detention was the subject of an Inspector General review. The CIA's June 2013 Response does not quantify the number of wrongfully detained individuals, other than to assert that it was "far fewer" than the 26 documented by the Committee. The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that "the Agency frequently moved too slowly to release detainees," and that "[o]f the 26 cases cited by the Study, we adjudicated only three cases in less than 31 days. Most took three to six months. CIA should have acted sooner." As detailed in the Study, there was no accountability for personnel responsible for the extended detention of individuals determined by the CIA to have been wrongfully detained.
- ↑ ALEC ( ; DIRECTOR ; DIRECTOR ; ALEC . Despite the CIA's conclusion that these individuals did not meet the standard for detention, these individuals were included in the list of 26 wrongfully detained if they were released, but not if they were transferred to the custody of another country. The list thus does not include Hamid Aich, although CIA Headquarters recognized that Aich did not meet the threshold for unilateral CIA custody, and sought to place him in Country custody where the CIA could still debrief him. (See DIRECTOR )). Hamid Aich was transferred to Country custody on April , 2003, and transferred to [another country's] custody more than a month later. (See 36682 ; 38836 ). The list also does not include Mohammad Dinshah, despite a determination prior to his capture that the CIA "does not view Dinshah as meeting the 'continuing serious threat' threshold required for this operation to be conducted pursuant to [CIA] authority," and a determination, after his capture, that "he does not meet the strict standards required to go to [DETENTION SITE COBALT]." (See DIRECTOR ; HEADQUARTERS ). Dinshah was transferred to custody. See HEADQUARTERS ; 412041 ; 60937 .
1530 04); 1537 04); 1542 04); email from: [REDACTED] (COB [DETENTION SITE BLACK]); to: ; cc: , , ; subject: re date: April 30, 2005).
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