Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/90

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(TS// //NF) The DCI interrogation guidelines also included the first requirements related to recordkeeping, instructing that, for "each interrogation session in which an enhanced technique is employed," the field prepare a "substantially contemporaneous record… setting forth the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable."[1] In practice, these guidelines were not followed.[2]

(TS// //NF) There were also administrative changes to the program. As noted, on December 3, 2002, CTC's Renditions Group formally assumed responsibility for the management and maintenance of all CIA detention and interrogation facilities.[3] Prior to that time, the interrogation program was "joined at the hip" with CTC's ALEC Station, according to  CTC Legal, although another CTC attorney who was directly involved in the program informed the CIA OIG that she "was never sure what group in CTC was responsible for interrogation activities."[4] Even after the formal designation of the CIA's Renditions Group,[5] tensions continued, particularly between CTC personnel who supported SWIGERT and DUNBAR's continued role, and the Renditions Group, which designated   as the


  1. DIRECTOR   (302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR   (311702Z JAN 03). Despite the formal record keeping requirement, the CIA's June 2013 Response argues that detailed reporting on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at CIA detention sites was not necessary, stating: "First, the decline in reporting over time on the use of enhanced techniques, which the Study characterizes as poor or deceptive record keeping, actually reflects the maturation of the program. In early 2003, a process was put in place whereby interrogators requested permission in advance for interrogation plans. The use of these plans for each detainee obviated the need for reporting in extensive detail on the use of specific techniques, unless there were deviations from the approved plan." As detailed in the Study, the process put in place by the CIA in early 2003 explicitly required record keeping, including "the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable." That requirement was never revised.
  2. Subsequent to the January 2003 guidance, many cables reporting the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques listed the techniques used on a particular day, but did not describe the frequency with which those techniques were employed, nor did they integrate the specific techniques into narratives of the interrogations. As the CIA interrogation program continued, descriptions of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were recorded in increasingly summarized form, providing little information on how or when the techniques were applied during an interrogation. There are also few CIA records detailing the rendition process for detainees and their transportation to or between detention sites. CIA records do include detainee comments on their rendition experiences and photographs of detainees in the process of being transported. Based on a review of the photographs, detainees transported by the CIA by aircraft were typically hooded with their hands and feet shackled. The detainees wore large headsets to eliminate their ability to hear, and these headsets were typically affixed to a detainee's head with duct tape that ran the circumference of the detainee's head. CIA detainees were placed in diapers and not permitted to use the lavatory on the aircraft. Depending on the aircraft, detainees were either strapped into seats during the flights, or laid down and strapped to the floor of the plane horizontally like cargo. See CIA photographs of renditions among CIA materials provided to the Committee pursuant to the Committee's document requests, as well as CIA detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information on the transport of CIA detainees.
  3. DIRECTOR   (032336Z DEC 03)
  4. Interview of  , by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003. Interview of  , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, February 14, 2003. CTC Chief of Operations told the Inspector General that the program was handled by the Abu Zubaydah Task Force. See February 11, 2003, interview report of  , Office of the Inspector General.
  5. As noted, the CIA's Rendition Group is variably known as the "Renditions Group," the "Renditions and Detainees Group," the "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG."

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