Page:United States Army Field Manual 3-13 Information Operations.djvu/19

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1-48. Successful IO depends on effective ISR and IM. ISR occurs both within and outside the C2 system. Surveillance and reconnaissance assets collect data throughout the area of interest. Intelligence assets process this data into intelligence. Commanders use this intelligence to focus the other elements of combat power. IM occurs within the C2 system. It enables both ISR and IO. Effective IM ensures intelligence and other RI gets to the commander in time to make decisions. Commanders apply the leadership element of combat power by using their judgment to make those decisions. 1-49. IM, IO, and ISR each have a different focus. ISR collects data and produces intelligence. IM disseminates and uses RI throughout the C2 system. IO applies that RI to protect the friendly C2 system, attack the adversary C2 system, and shape the information environment. All are essential to achieving and maintaining information superiority. ACHIEVING INFORMATION SUPERIORITY


1-50. To achieve information superiority, commanders focus efforts to improve the friendly operational picture while affecting adversary battlefield perceptions in a way that leads them to make decisions favoring friendly forces. This situation provides a window of opportunity for decisive operations at times and places the commander chooses. Absolute and sustained information superiority is not possible. Adversary actions, friendly counteractions, and adversary reactions frequently determine how long friendly forces can exploit it. 1-51. Adversaries exercise a variety of means to protect their C2 systems. Some use means similar to those of friendly forces; others employ asymmetric means and methods. Similarly, adversaries use various capabilities to attack friendly C2 systems and shape the information environment in their favor. Regardless of friendly force capabilities, information superiority can decay quickly. A technologically equal opponent can use technological means to negate friendly information superiority. A technologically inferior opponent may use less sophisticated means or superior technology in one area to counter friendly capabilities. Thus, friendly commanders do not seek to sustain information superiority over an extended period. They act to forge localized information superiority when and where it produces decisive results. 1-52. Information superiority exists relative to an adversary. Commanders may not know when they have information superiority. However, when the information available to commanders allows them to accurately visualize the situation, anticipate events, and make appropriate, timely decisions better than adversary commanders can, information superiority exists. Information superiority enhances commanders’ freedom of action and allows them to execute decisions and maintain the initiative. However, commanders recognize that without continuous IO designed to achieve and retain information superiority, adversaries may counter its advantages and possibly wrest it from them. Commanders achieve information superiority by maintaining accurate situational understanding through effective IM (including NETOPS) and ISR while creating a disparity between reality and how adversaries perceive it. The more IO shapes this disparity, the greater the friendly advantage.