1788.
He obſerved, that he did not controvert the general doctrine advanced by the oppoſite council, that the law of nations, is the law of nature applied to nations, and that one ſovereign power cannot be bound by another; but he diſtinguiſhed between the neceſſary, and the voluntary law of nations, which ariſes ex comitate. Valt. preſ. 12. Ibid. p. 6. and inſiſted that the laws of a nation actually enforced, are every where obligatory, unleſs they interfere with the independency of another Legiſlature. 2 Hub. 26. for, common convienency renders it neceſſary to give a certain degree of force to the ſtatutes of foreign nations. 2 Ld. Kaim. Prin. Eq. 350. 360.
If nations, unconnected by any tie, thus indirectly give effect to the laws of each other, the principle upon which it is done, muſt with greater ſtrength prevail in the caſe of a political union like that of the American States. It is true, that theſe States are ſaid to be ſovereign and independent; but they are evidently bound by a link which muſt be taken into view, or we ſhall argue wrong in the abſtract. Thus, it is declared by the articles of Confederation, that a citizen of one State, is a citizen of every State; and the Congreſs are not, as Mr. Adams[1] has termed them, as Aſſemblage of Ambaſſadors; but a ſovereign power, and capable of ſuing like a corporation, without any expreſs ſtatute to enable them. See ant. 41.
But, the operation and effect of a ſentence, or judgment, of a foreign Court, cannot ſurely be more binding than the act of a foreign Legiſlature; and theſe, ex comitate et jure gentium, are in many caſes final. 1 Black. Rep. 258. 262. Vatt. lib. 2. c. 7. ſect. 84. p. 147. If a debtor be diſcharged where the debt was contracted, he is equally ſo in every other place; ſo that it Lockwood had been diſcharged by the State of Connecticut, this ſuit would not be maintainable againſt him even in the King’s Bench of England. Co. B. L. 347. The Court of Chancery held itſelf bound by the deciſion of a competent foreign juriſdiction, declaring an acceptance to be void; 2 Stra. 733. and, becauſe a debt had been diſcharged according to the lex loci, though in the depreciated paper money of North-Carolina, Lord Thurlow, ſince the revolution, has refuſed a ne exeat regno. Brown. 376. A ſimilar principle has governed the Supreme Court, in the caſe of Millar v. Hall (ant. 229) and this Court, in the cafes of Thompſon vs. Young (ant. 294.) and Le Clerc vs. Richette.
A diſtinction is likewiſe to be obſerved between a foreign ſentence authorizing, and a foreign ſentence diſmiſſing, a claim; for, if the proper tribunal diſmiſſes a claim, the ſentence is definitive. 2 Ld. Kaim. Prin. Eq. 375. and in that deſcription the proceedings, as far as they affect Lockwood, muſt be included. The caſe in Carth. 373 is certainly right as a general rule; but it is liable to ſeveral exceptions; for, 1ſt, The law of one country may indirectly have effect in another, by the voluntary law of nations; 2dly, If a right of action has been legally transferred in one juriſdiction, the rule by which it is to operate, is the fame in every other juriſdiction, and 3dly, Where a debtor has been diſmiſſed
- ↑ See Mr. Adams’s “Defence of the American Conftitution.”
