147 Fed. Rep. 226, affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Livingston Gifford for appellant:
Appellant’s interpretation is in accord. with the policy of the law and appellee’s interpretation is not. The policy of the law is to protect the author against every form of piracy without distinction, and the piracy of a musical composition by reproducing and selling it in the form of perforated music is just as culpable as in any other form.
The Constitution purports to secure to authors “the exclusive right to their respective writings,” and it is obviously not compatible with this to protect them only against the sale of their writings in a form which requires no assistance of mechanism for reading.
As this interpretation is the only one which will carry out its policy, the statute should certainly be so interpreted, unless such interpretation is inconsistent with its terms or with the terms of the Constitution.
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution, as interpreted by the decisions, is broad enough to include perforated music.
See the copyright law in which Congress has included as writings (§ 4952), books, maps, charts, dramatic or musical compositions, engravings, etc. In principle we ask for no broader interpretation here. And see also Lithograph Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53; Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 86; Bleistein