Page:United States Reports, Volume 257.djvu/87

Arsdale, 15 Wall. 75. Redfield v. Bartels, 139 U. S. 694. But in any event the statute supposes a suit already begun against the officer in his lifetime. We need not consider the remedies against the United States. United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28; Sage v. United States, 250 U. S. 33. It appears to us plain without further discussion that both questions must be answered: No.

Answers to Questions 1 and 2: No.

Mr. Justice McKenna and Mr. Justice Clarke dissent.

---

EX PARTE IN THE MATTER OF LINCOLN GAS & ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, PETITIONER.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING OF APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS.

Where a decree of the District Court, upholding as adequate a gas rate fixed by a city ordinance, was affirmed by this court without prejudice to the bringing of a new suit to restrain enforcement if changed conditions should make the rate confiscatory,—

Held: (1) That, until such new suit was begun, the ordinance was established by the decision as the lawful and exclusive measure of the rates chargeable by the plaintiff gas company. P. 9.

(2) That the original suit did not end until the going down of the mandate from this court. P. 9.

(3) That a new suit filed at that time, and the granting of a restraining order therein, could affect only the then future operation of the ordinance, and could not oust the District Court of its jurisdiction, ancillary to the former suit, to award restitution, gauged by the ordinance rate, of overcharges exacted by the plaintiff from its consumers during the period between the original decree of that court and the going down of the mandate. P. 9.

(4) That the ancillary jurisdiction was independent of whether the plaintiff's injunction bond, in the former suit, was sufficient to cover the overcharges. P. 10.

Rehearing denied.