PUBLIC LAW 103-236—APR. 30, 1994 108 STAT. 523 safeguards violations without compromising national security or intelligence sources or methods; (10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear facility or sensitive nuclear technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state to notify the IAEA prior to export and to require safeguards over that facility or technology, regardless of its destination; and (11) seek agreement among the parties to the Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and to establish new limits on the right to withdraw from the Treaty. SEC. 842. IAEA INTERNAL REFORMS. In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in the implementetion of the safeguards responsibilities of the IAEA, the Congress urges the President to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to^ (1) improve the access of the IAEA within nuclear facilities that are capable of producing, processing, or fabricating special nuclear material suitable for use in a nuclear explosive device; (2)(A) facilitate the IAEA's efforts to meet and to maintain its own goals for detecting the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment, giving particular attention to facilities in which there are bulk quantities of plutonium; and (B) if it is not technically feasible for the IAEA to meet those detection goals in a particular facility, require the IAEA to declare publicly that it is unable to do so; (3) enable the IAEA to issue fines for violations of safeguards procedures, to pay rewards for information on possible safeguards violations, and to establish a '^ot line" for the reporting of such violations and other illicit uses of weaponsgrade nuclear material; (4) establish safeguards at facilities engaged in the manufacture of equipment or material that is especially designated or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material or, in the case of non-nuclear-weapon stetes, of any nuclear explosive device; (5) esteblish safeguards over nuclear research and development activities and facilities; (6) implement special inspections of undeclared nuclear facilities, as provided for under existing safeguards procedures, and seek authority for the IAEA to conduct challenge inspections on demand at suspected nuclear sites; (7) expand the scope of safeguards to include tritium, uraniiun concentrates, and nuclear waste conteining special fissionable material, and increase the scope of such safeguards on heavy water; (8) revise downward the IAEA's official minimum amounts of nuclear material ^significant quantity") needed to make a nuclear explosive device and esteblish these amounts as national rather than facility stendards; (9) expand the use of full-time resident IAEA inspectors at sensitive fuel cycle facilities; (10) promote the use of near real time material accoiuitency in the conduct of safeguards at facilities that use, produce, or store significant quantities of special fissionable material;
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