PUBLIC LAW 106-65—OCT. 5, 1999 113 STAT. 807 treaty with the Russian Federation that would require reductions in United States strategic nuclear forces, that— (1) the strategic nuclear forces and nuclear modernization programs of the People's Republic of China and every other nation possessing nuclear weapons should be taken into full consideration in the negotiation of such treaty; and (2) the reductions in United States strategic nuclear forces under such a treaty should not be to such an extent as to impede the capability of the United States to respond militarily to any militarily significant increase in the threat to United States security or strategic stability posed by the People's Republic of China and any other nation. SEC. 1503. REPORT ON STRATEGIC STABILITY UNDER START III. (a) REPORT. — Not later than September 1, 2000, the Secretary President, of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report, to be prepared in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, on the stability of the future strategic nuclear posture of the United States for deterring the Russian Federation and other potential nuclear adversaries. (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.— The Secretary shall, at a minimum, include in the report the following: (1) A discussion of the policy defining the deterrence and military-political objectives of the United States against potential nuclear adversaries. (2) A discussion of the military requirements for United States nuclear forces, the force structure and capabilities necessary to meet those requirements, and how they relate to the achievement of the objectives identified under paragraph (1). (3) A projection of the strategic nuclear force posture of the United States and the Russian Federation that is anticipated under a further Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (referred to as "START III"), and an explanation of whether and how United States nuclear forces envisioned under that posture would be capable of meeting the military sufficiency requirements identified under paragraph (2). (4) The Secretary assessment of Russia's nuclear force posture under START III compared to its present force, including its size, vulnerability, and capability for launch on tactical warning, and an assessment of whether strategic stability would be enhanced or diminished under START III, including any stabilizing and destabilizing factors and possible incentives or disincentives for Russia to launch a first strike, or otherwise use nuclear weapons, against the United States in a possible future crisis. (5) The Secretary's assessment of the nuclear weapon capabilities of China and other potential nuclear weapon "rogue" states in the foreseeable future, and an assessment of the effect of these capabilities on strategic stability, including their ability and inclination to use nuclear weapons against the United States in a possible future crisis. (6) The Secretary's assessment of whether asymmetries between the United States and Russia, including doctrine, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and active and passive defenses, are likely to erode strategic stability in the foreseeable future.
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