113 STAT. 1264 PUBLIC LAW 106-79—OCT. 25, 1999 Deadline. SEC. 8125. (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than January 31, 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees in both classified and unclassified form a report on the conduct of Operation Desert Fox and Operation Allied Force (also referred to as Operation Noble Anvil). The Secretary of Defense shall submit to such committees a preliminary report on the conduct of these operations not later than December 15, 1999. The report (including the preliminary report) should be prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command, and the Commander in Chief of the United States au*opean Command. (b) REVIEW OF SUCCESSES AND DEFICIENCIES.— The report should contain a thorough review of the successes and deficiencies of these operations, with respect to the following matters: (1) United States military objectives in these operations. (2) With respect to Operation Allied Force, the military strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to obtain said military objectives. (3) The command structiu-e for the execution of Operation AlUed Force. (4) The process for identifying, nominating, selecting, and verifying targets to be attacked during Operation Desert Fox and Operation Allied Force. (5) A comprehensive battle damage assessment of targets prosecuted during the conduct of the air campaigns in these operations, to include— (A) fixed targets, both mihtary and civilian, to include bridges, roads, rsdl lines, airfields, power generating pleints, broadcast facihties, oil refining infi*astructure, fiiel and munitions storage installations, industried pleints producing military eqmpment, command and control nodes, civilian leadership bunkers and military barracks; (B) mobile military targets such as tanks, armored personnel csirriers, artillery pieces, trucks, and air defense assets; (C) with respect to Operation Desert Fox, research and production facilities associated with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, and any military units or organizations associated with such activities within Iraq; and (D) a discussion of decoy, deception and coiuiter-intelligence techniques employed by the Iraqi and Serbian military. (6) The use and performance of United States military equipment, weapon systems, munitions, and national and tactical reconnaisseince and surveillance assets (including items classified under special access procedures) and an analysis of— (A) any equipment or capabilities that were in research and development and if available could have been used in these operations' respective theater of operations; (B) any equipment or capabilities that were available and could have been used but were not introduced into these operations' respective theater of operations; and (C) any equipment or capabilities that were introduced to these operations' respective theater of operations that could have been used but were not.
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