benefit of that bond (the “thing of value”) to be at least $5,000. And to the extent the jury also considered the value of difficult-to-quantify benefits such as the clients’ liberty interests, that is precisely where the wisdom of the jury is most useful and where courts should be reluctant to step in on review.
In sum, we hold that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the transactional element of § 666(a)(1)(B) was satisfied with respect to Counts Two and Three.[1] We now address the remainder of the evidence with respect to each count.
As described above, the December 2016 sting where Perez “purchased wood” from Delgado for $260 in order to secure a PR bond for Raul Sanchez forms the basis of Count Two. Delgado argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to show an “explicit” agreement between Delgado and Perez to exchange money for an official act.[2] In making this argument, Delgado mainly points to portions of Perez’s testimony on cross-examination where Perez purportedly denies that he bribed Delgado, denies there was a quid pro quo, and characterizes the wood payments as
- ↑ Delgado makes no argument on appeal that the jury was misinstructed as to the term “value” or that he was limited in any way on this point in making his closing argument.
- ↑ In his briefing, Delgado repeatedly refers to what he purports to be the “explicitness requirement” of § 666(a)(1)(B), citing as his sole legal authority the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1992). However, Carpenter did not involve § 666; rather, it concerned “official right” extortion under the Hobbs Act. Id. at 825. Regardless, while the Ninth Circuit required “the quid pro quo [to] be clear and unambiguous” with respect to Hobbs Act extortion, it also described that the “understanding need not be verbally explicit.” Id. at 827. The court explained that to require an official to “specifically state[] that he will exchange official action for a contribution … would allow officials to escape liability under the Hobbs Act with winks and nods … .” Id.
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