when making its calculation, “the district court need not determine the value of the benefit with precision.” Griffin, 324 F.3d at 366. And because a sentencing judge “is in a unique position to assess the evidence”—especially having presided at trial—its calculations under sections 2C1.1 and 2B1.1 are “entitled to appropriate deference.” United States v. Teel, 691 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2012).
Here, Delgado’s argument that the district court erred in calculating the value of the PR bonds for sentencing purposes largely mirrors his argument with respect to the value of the PR bonds for purposes of the transactional element of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), discussed above. In short, he argues that although the PR bonds would require the recipient to forfeit $5,000 if they violated the terms of the bond, because the recipient had to pay nothing up front the value of the benefit received must be considered less than $5,000.
The Guidelines define “the benefit received” in return for bribe payments as “the net value of such benefit.” U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 cmt. n.3 (2018). While legally distinct from our discussion above regarding the transactional value element of § 666(a)(1)(B), the question of the “net value” of the PR bonds to Perez’s clients is conceptually similar. We do not reanalyze the issue in depth. At its core, the “value” someone receives from a PR bond is intertwined with a liberty interest that is hard to definitively quantify. We do not think it was error—let alone clear error—for the district court to value the bonds at the amount Perez’s clients were willing to risk forfeiting in order to secure the bonds. We therefore reject Delgado’s challenge to his sentence.
IV
Delgado’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
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