fied. 521 U.S., at 823. Here, by contrast, passage by the House was needed for DOMA to become law. U.S. Const., Art. I, §7 (bicameralism and presentment requirements for legislation).
I appreciate the argument that the Constitution confers on the President alone the authority to defend federal law in litigation, but in my view, as I have explained, that argument is contrary to the Court's holding in Chadha, and it is certainly contrary to the Chadha Court's endorsement of the principle that "Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute" when the Executive refuses to do so on constitutional grounds. 462 U.S., at 940. See also 2 U.S.C. §288h(7) (Senate Legal Counsel shall defend the constitutionality of Acts of Congress when placed in issue).[1] Accordingly, in the narrow category of cases in which a court strikes down an Act of Congress and the Executive declines to defend the Act, Congress both has standing to defend the undefended statute and is a proper party to do so.
II
Windsor and the United States argue that §3 of DOMA violates the equal protection principles that the Court has found in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Brief for Respondent Windsor (merits) 17–62; Brief for United States (merits) 16–54; cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Court rests its holding on related arguments. See ante, at 24–25.
Same-sex marriage presents a highly emotional and important question of public policy—but not a difficult question of constitutional law. The Constitution does not
- ↑ Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), is not to the contrary. The Court's statements there concerned enforcement, not defense.
