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"to buy our corn cheaply, nor to pay for it in the regular course of our trade." If this demand were granted, and the corn so imported alone consumed in London, it is clear that, on an average of years, the inhabitants of the town and country would fare alike, and the agriculturist would have no ground for complaint; would he then have any, if, the communication between the town and country being unrestricted, the inhabitants of either bought their corn where they found it cheapest? This is the position which would result from a fixed duty; let us follow it out. In a year of ordinary productiveness, the people of the country would consume the home-grown corn, and those of the town the foreign corn. In a year of superabundance, the agriculturist would find in the town customers for his surplus, (which he could then sell at a less price than that of foreign corn,) and the benefit he would derive from this extension of his market would be an exact equivalent for the damage he might sustain by the introduction of foreign corn among country consumers in a deficient year. Thus the agriculturist would incur no disadvantage which is not counterbalanced, and the consumer having two sources of supply would be guarded from the extremes of price which might result from being confined to one.
Sir James Graham winds up his argument on protection "tersely and truly" (he says) in this
