ſelf, ſays he, you at the ſame time repeal the prohibitory clauſe, which guards againſt ſuch repeal[1]."
10. Lastly, acts of parliament that are impoſſible to be performed are of no validity; and if there ariſe out of them collaterally any abſurd conſequences, manifeſtly contradictory to common reaſon, they are, with regard to thoſe collateral conſequences, void. I lay down the rule with theſe reſtrictions; though I know it is generally laid down more largely, that acts of parliament contrary to reaſon are void. But if the parliament will poſitively enact a thing to be done which is unreaſonable, I know of no power that can control it: and the examples uſually alleged in ſupport of this ſenſe of the rule do none of them prove, that where the main object of a ſtatute is unreaſonable the judges are at liberty to reject it; for that were to ſet the judicial power above that of the legiſlature, which would be ſubverſive of all government. But where ſome collateral matter ariſes out of the general words, and happens to be unreaſonable; there the judges are in decency to conclude that this conſequence was not foreſeen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to expound the ſtatute by equity, and only quoad hoc diſregard it. Thus if an act of parliament gives a man power to try all cauſes, that ariſe within his manor of Dale; yet, if a cauſe ſhould ariſe in which he himſelf is party, the act is conſtrued not to extend to that, becauſe it is unreaſonable that any man ſhould determine his own quarrel[2]. But, if we could conceive it poſſible for the parliament to enact, that he ſhould try as well his own cauſes as thoſe of other perſons, there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the legiſlature, when couched in ſuch evident and expreſs words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the legiſlature or no.
These are the ſeveral grounds of the laws of England: over and above which, equity is alſo frequently called in to aſſiſt, to
