tribunal, there would ſoon be an end of the conſtitution, by deſtroying the free agency of one of the conſtituent parts of the ſovereign legiſlative power.
Are then, it may be aſked, the ſubjects of England totally deſtitute of remedy, in caſe the crown ſhould invade their rights, either by private injuries, or public oppreſſions? To this we may anſwer, that the law has provided a remedy in both caſes.
And, firſt, as to private injuries; if any perſon has, in point of property, a juſt demand upon the king, he muſt petition him in his court of chancery, where his chancellor will adminiſter right as a matter of grace, though not upon compulſion[1]. And this is entirely conſonant to what is laid down by the writers on natural law. “A ſubject, ſays Puffendorf[2], ſo long as he continues a ſubject, hath no way to oblige his prince to give him his due, when he refuſes it; though no wiſe prince will ever refuſe to ſtand to a lawful contract. And, if the prince gives the ſubject leave to enter an action againſt him, upon ſuch contract, in his own courts, the action itſelf proceeds rather upon natural equity, than upon the municipal laws.” For the end of ſuch action is not to compel the prince to obſerve the contract, but to perſuade him. And, as to perſonal wrongs; it is well obſerved by Mr Locke[3], “the harm which the ſovereign can do in his own perſon not being likely to happen often, nor to extend itſelf far; nor being able by his ſingle ſtrength to ſubvert the laws, nor oppreſs the body of the people, (ſhould any prince have ſo much weakneſs and ill nature as to endeavour to do it)—the inconveniency therefore of ſome particular miſchiefs, that may happen ſometimes, when a heady prince comes to the throne, are well recompenſed by the peace of the public and ſecurity of the government, in the perſon of the chief magiſtrate being thus ſet out of the reach of danger.”
- ↑ Finch. L. 255.
- ↑ Law of N. and N. b. 8. c. 10.
- ↑ on Gov. p. 2. §. 205.
