Yet ſtill, notwithſtanding this perſonal perfection, which the law attributes to the ſovereign, the conſtitution has allowed a latitude of ſuppoſing the contrary, in reſpect to both houſes of parliament; each of which, in it’s turn, hath exerted the right of remonſtrating and complaining to the king even of thoſe acts of royalty, which are moſt properly and perſonally his own; ſuch as meſſages ſigned by himſelf, and ſpeeches delivered from the throne. And yet, ſuch is the reverence which is paid to the royal perſon, that though the two houſes have an undoubted right to conſider theſe acts of ſtate in any light whatever, and accordingly treat them in their addreſſes as perſonally proceeding from the prince, yet, among themſelves, (to preſerve the more perfect decency, and for the greater freedom of debate) they uſually ſuppoſe them to flow from the advice of the adminiſtration. But the privilege of canvaſſing thus freely the perſonal acts of the ſovereign (either directly, or even through the medium of his reputed adviſers) belongs to no individual, but is confined to thoſe auguſt aſſemblies: and there too the objections muſt be propoſed with the utmoſt reſpect and deference. One member was ſent to the tower[1], for ſuggeſting that his majeſty’s anſwer to the addreſs of the commons contained "high words, to fright the members out of their duty;" and another[2], for ſaying that a part of the king’s ſpeech "ſeemed rather to be calculated for the meridian of Germany than Great Britain, and that the king was a ſtranger to our language and conſtitution."
In farther purſuance of this principle, the law alſo determines that in the king can be no negligence, or laches, and therefore no delay will bar his right. Nullum tempus occurrit regi is the ſtanding maxim upon all occaſions: for the law intends that the king is always buſied for the public good, and therefore has not leiſure to aſſert his right within the times limited to ſubjects[3]. In the king alſo can be no ſtain or corruption of blood: for if the heir to
