Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation/Concurrence Marshall

by Thurgood Marshall

United States Supreme Court

400 U.S. 542

Phillips  v.  Martin Marietta Corporation

 Argued: Dec. 9, 1970. --- Decided: Jan 25, 1971

Mr. Justice MARSHALL, concurring.

While I agree that this case must be remanded for a full development of the facts, I cannot agree with the Court's indication that a 'bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of' Martin Marietta's business could be established by a showing that some women, even the vast majority, with pre-school-age children have family responsibilities that interfere with job performance and that men do not usually have such responsibilities. Certainly, an employer can require that all of his employees, both men and women, meet minimum performance standards, and he can try to insure compliance by requiring parents, both mothers and fathers, to provide for the care of their children so that job performance is not interfered with.

But the Court suggests that it would not require such uniform standards. I fear that in this case, where the issue is not squarely before us, the Court has fallen into the trap of assuming that the Act permits ancient canards about the proper role of women to be a basis for discrimination. Congress, however, sought just the opposite result.

By adding ^[1] the prohibition against job discrimination based on sex to the 1964 Civil Rights Act Congress intended to prevent employers from refusing 'to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.' Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.1(a)(i)(ii). See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (CA7 1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (CA5 1969). Even characterizations of the proper domestic roles of the sexes were not to serve as predicates for restricting employment opportunity. ^[2] The exception for a 'bona fide occupational qualification' was not intended to swallow the rule.

That exception has been construed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, whose regulations are entitled to 'great deference,' Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965), to be applicable only to job situations that require specific physical characteristics necessarily possessed by only one sex. ^[3] Thus the exception would apply where necessary 'for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness' ^[4] in the employment of actors or actresses, fashion models, and the like. ^[5] If the exception is to be limited ^[6] as Congress intended, the Commission has given it the only possible construction.

When performance characteristics of an individual are involved, even when parental roles are concerned, employment opportunity may be limited only by employment criteria that are neutral as to the sex of the applicant.

Notes

1. The ban on discrimination based on sex was added to the Act by an amendment offered during the debate in the House by Rep. Smith of Virginia. 110 Cong.Rec. 2577.
2. See Neal v. American Airlines, Inc., 1 CCH Employment Practices Guide 6002 (EEOC 1968); Colvin v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 1 CCH Employment Practices Guide 6003 (EEOC 1968); 110 Cong.Rec. 2578 (remarks of Rep. Bass).
3. The Commission's regulations provide:
4. 29 CFR § 1604.1(a)(2), n. 3, supra.
5. See 110 Cong.Rec. 7217 (memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case).
6. 110 Cong.Rec. 7213 (memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case).