Richelieu Navigation Company v. Boston Marine Insurance Company/Opinion of the Court
|Richelieu Navigation Company v. Boston Marine Insurance Company by
Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
RICHELIEU NAVIGATION COMPANY v. BOSTON MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY
In Liverpool, etc., Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 438, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469, it is said: 'Collision or stranding is, doubtless, a peril of the seas; and a policy of insurance against perils of the seas covers a loss by stranding or collision, although arising from the negligence of the master or crew, because the insurer assumes to indemnify the assured against losses from particular perils, and the assured does not warrant that his servants shall use due care to avoid them.' But in the case at bar there is an express exception of all perils and losses occasioned by the want of ordinary care and skill in navigation and of seaworthiness. The Spartan was a Canadian vessel, and was navigating Canadian waters, between two Canadian ports, and was bound to comply with the laws of Canada. The Canadian statute put in evidence (1 St. Can. 1880, p. 236) is entitled 'An act to make better provisions respecting the navigation of Canadian waters,' and prescribes certain rules, among them that every ship, whether a sailing ship or steam-ship, shall go at a moderate speed in a fog, mist, or falling snow, and shall not be exonerated by anything in the rules from the consequences of any neglect to keep a proper lookout, or of the neglect of any ordinary precaution, or precaution required by the special circumstances of the case. These statutory rules correspond with those revised by an order of council in England in August, 1879, (see 4 Prob. Div. 241,) and prescribed by congress, (Rev. St. § 4233; Act March 3, 1885, 23 St. 438,) and recognized as international rules. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 370, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860; The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170. Section 7 of the Canadian statute provides that, 'in case any damage to person or property arises from the non-observance by any vessel or raft of any of the rules prescribed by this act, such damage shall be de med to have been occasioned by the willful default of the person in charge of such raft or of the deck of such vessel at the time, unless the contrary be proved, or it be shown to the satisfaction of the court that the circumstances of the case rendered a departure from the said rules necessary, and the owner of the vessel or raft, in all civil proceedings, and the master or person in charge as aforesaid, or the owner,-if it appears that he was in fault,-in all proceedings, civil or criminal, shall be subject to the legal consequences of such default.'
In The Pennsylvania, 19 Wall. 125, it was held that, where a vessel has committed a positive breach of statute, she must show not only that probably her fault did not contribute to the disaster, but that it could not have done so. And this was but the statement of the settled rule in collision cases. In this case, in view of the seventh section of the Canadian statute, and the fact that perils occasioned by the want of ordinary care and skill or of seaworthiness were excepted by the policy, the same rule is applicable; hence the burden was on the plaintiff to show that neither the speed of the steamer nor the defect of the compass could have caused, or contributed to cause, the stranding. If it appeared that the misconduct or unseaworthiness was causa sine qua non, it was an excepted peril; and that, as stated by Judge BROWN, 'ought to suffice for the exoneration of the underwriter in a case where a steamer, equipped with a compass known to be defective, is driven in a dense fog, with unabated speed, and in direct violation of a local statute, upon an island lying but eight miles off her usual track.' 26 Fed. Rep. 606. We think there was no error in giving the eleventh instruction asked by the defendant, and forming the subject of the eighteenth assignment of error. And this disposes also of the sixteenth and seventeenth errors assigned, as the burden was upon the plaintiff to show that the stranding, and its consequent losses, misfortunes, and expenses, were caused by perils insured against, and, as to the perils consequent upon and arising from or caused by the want of ordinary care and skill in navigating the vessel, plaintiff was its own insurer.
And the same result must attend the fourth, fifth, and sixth errors assigned, which question the refusal of the court to instruct the jury, as requested in the first, second, and third of the plaintiff's instructions, that the stranding of the Spartan, while a dense fog was prevailing, was an accident which was prima facie covered by the policy, and for which the insurers were prima facie liable, and that, if the fog contributed proximately to the stranding, the insurers would be liable.
The jury were entitled to draw their conclusions, not from a part, but from the whole, of the facts in the case, and the difficulty in these instructions is that they are based upon a partial view of the testimony. It was necessary to the plaintiff's case that it should appear from the whole proof that the loss was not occasioned by the want of ordinary care by the master, or on account of unseaworthiness, and was not within exceptions contained in the policy, against which plaintiff was not insured. Insurance Co. v. Smith, 124 U.S. 405, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534. The jury were the judges of all the facts proved; and the court charged that if they found that the vessel 'was carried ashore by the current, or by any mysterious cause which you are unable to explain, then the loss will be within the policy, and the plaintiff would be entitled to recover;' and again, 'if you find that this vessel was stranded by reason of want of ordinary care and skill in her navigation, or by reason of a defective compass, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover; on the other hand, if you find that she was stranded by circumstances, by reason of the current, or by perils of the sea,-any other peril of the sea,-then the plaintiff would be entitled to your verdict;' and also: 't randing is one of the perils insured against in the policy, and if the jury find that the stranding was the proximate result of the fog or currents of the lake prevailing, then the owners of the steamer have made a case which entitles them to your verdict in this case.' It appears to us that this branch of the case was left to the jury in a manner in respect to which the plaintiff has no ground of complaint. Certainly the state of facts disclosed by the record precludes the claim that instructions more favorable to the plaintiff could reasonably have been given, and this is illustrated by cases cited.
Bazin v. Steam-Ship Co., 3 Wall. Jr. 229, 238, was a suit for loss of merchandise under a bill of lading, which absolved the carrier from 'accidents from machinery, boilers, steam, or any other accidents of the seas, rivers, and steam navigation, of whatever nature or kind soever.' The steamer was wrecked on Cape Race in a snow-storm, under the following circumstances: 'She struck the point of Cape Race. Up to that time she continued perfectly seaworthy. If she had not struck, at the average rate of our passage, we would have been in Philadelphia in five days more. The steamer was wrecked. We backed off the point of Cape Race, and run her on shore to save the lives of the passengers, and to keep her from sinking. There was no tempest; she struck in a dense fog, and the sinking of the vessel, and the damage done, resulted from her striking the cape.' 'Here, then,' said Mr. Justice ,GRIER, 'we have no other reason given by the captain, nor any testimony whatever, as to how or why this great mistake of running against a cape occurred. The answer and the witness both seem to assume that running against a cape or a continent is one of the usual accidents and unavoidable dangers of the sea. That cannot be termed an 'accident of the sea' within the exceptions of the bill of lading, which proper foresight and skill in the commanding officer might have avoided. If the compass on the new iron vessel was not sufficiently protected to traverse correctly, the vessel was as little sea worthy as if she had no compass, and this should have been carefully ascertained before she started on her voyage. If there was no fault in the compass, then it is very evident that the officer, who is 30 or 40 miles wrong in his calculation, and driving through a thick fog with a full head of steam, and first discovers his true position by running on an island, a cape, or a continent, has neither the skill nor the prudence to be intrusted with such a command; and for want of such an officer the vessel is not seaworthy. * * * That a steam-boat has been either ignorantly, carelessly, or recklessly dashed against a cape in a thick fog, cannot be received as a plea to discharge the carrier.' In The Kestrel, 6 Prob. Div. 182, the master was suspended by the wreck commissioner, with the concurrence of two captains sitting as assessors, because of the stranding of the steam-ship Kestrel by reason of negligent navigation, and this decision was affirmed by the court of appeals, Mr. Justice HANNEN and Sir ROBERT PHILLIMORE, assisted on the hearing by two of the elder brethren of the Trinity House. The wreck commissioner, among other reasons for his report, said: 'It appears to us that the master is in this dilemma: Either the weather was so foggy that it was not possible to see the island until they were within a ship's length of it, and in that case he would not have been justified in going at full speed, which we are told was ten knots an hour; or it was not very foggy, and in that case it is difficult to account for the island not having been seen until they were within a ship's length of it, unless, indeed, there was a very bad lookout being kept on board. In either case the master would seem to have been guilty of a neglect of the ordinary precautions required from seamen for the safe navigation of their vessels.' The court of appeals held that the master was guilty of a wrongful act in u nning the vessel at such a rate of speed as he did in the state of the weather which existed, and also in that he continued to steer the course he did in a fog. The exceptions in this policy protect the insurer against the excepted perils, as a shipper is protected under a bill of lading from loss to which the negligence of the carrier has contributed. And, as already remarked, if the peril was caused by negligence or unseaworthiness notwithstanding it was the fog which prevented the mate from seeing the island, the predominating and efficient cause was the negligence or unseaworthiness, and must be regarded as the proximate cause, under the circumstances. Waters v. Insurance Co., 11 Pet. 213; Insurance Co., v. Tansportation Co., 12 Wall. 194, 199.
The unseaworthiness especially relied on was the alleged defect of the compass.
The plaintiff in error complains of the refusal to give the fourth instruction asked by his counsel, as follows: 'There is no evidence in the case which even tends to prove the unseaworthiness of the Spartan, except in regard to her compass; and if the jury find that the compass did not vary more than vessels' compasses ordinarily do, that the steamer had been navigated by the same compass without trouble from the time that she left Lachine, on the St. Lawrence river, up to the time of the disaster, and that the officers of the steamer at the time she started upon the voyage on which the stranding took place believed the compass to be reliable, and had reason for so believing, then the insurers would not be relieved from liability on account of any supposed defect in the compass.' Exceptions were also taken to the parts of the charge italicised in the following: 'Upon the question of speed I will have a word to say, although it is covered, so far as the law of the case is concerned, by my general charge, that, if you find the loss occurred by her being navigated at an excessive speed, there can be no recovery; still it is for you to judge whether, under all the circumstances of the case, she was navigating at too great a speed. The law of Canada provides 'that all vessels shall run in a fog at a moderate rate of speed.' Now, it strikes me-but the question is one for your determination-that a vessel is not under an obligation while navigating the open lake to slacken her speed because of a fog, unless there is some reason to apprehend collision with another vessel, or unless the vessel is so near the shore, or known to be so near the shore, that she might run upon it, unless she was navigated at a less rate of speed; and if this compass had been a proper compass, and there was no reason to think it was otherwise, I should feel loth myself to charge the vessel with fault on account of excessive speed. On the other hand, if this compass were known to the captain, or he had good reason to believe it was defective, then it would strike me that in passing in the neighborhood of Caribou island he should have directed the speed of the steamer to be slowed. But, as I said before, gentlemen, that is a question for your consideration, and I do not undertake to direct you one way or the other in regard to this fact, but merely to say in general terms that if you find that the loss was occasioned by the excessive speed of the vessel, or by her want of a lookout, or by the defects of the compass, the defendant is not liable. With regard to the defective compass, the master and crew state in their protest that they attribute the loss to a defective compass; and while that statement is not binding upon the plaintiff here, and while the plaintiff is not estopped, as we say, or prevented, from showing that the loss is attributable to other causes, it undoubtedly is entitled to considerable weight. On the other hand, it is shown that the vessel had vavigated form Owen Sound up to Sault St. Marie, and from the Sault up to Port Arthur, with this compass, and that no unusual deviation had been detected, except that the captain thought the compass was a little slow, as he said. Now then, gentlemen, in case you shall find, as I have said before, that this loss was occasioned by a defective compass, the defendant is entitled to your verdict. On the other hand if you shall find that the loss occurred through peril of the sea, and from no want of skill in navigation, and no want of competency in the master or sufficiency of the crew, and from no fault on the part of the vessel, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff.' The court also instructed the jury: 'The stranding of said steamer at a point 17 miles out of the course on which said steamer was running in navigating the distance of about 130 miles is prima facie evidence that the compass was defective, and throws the burden of proving that the compass was correct upon the plaintiff. I charge you, as requested by the plaintiff in his eighth request, that the jury are entitled to consider the fact that the Spartan had been successfully navigated by this compass during the season up to the time of her stranding, and that on her final trip she had made a good course from Fort William to Silver island and from Silver island to Passage island, and that she was upon her usual course, when she passed the Quebec, as evidence tending to show that the officers had reason for believing that the compass was a proper one, and to rebut the charge that they were negligent in using that compass. The steamer is presumed to have been seaworthy, and that her officers were competent to navigate and manage her, and the insurers are not entitled to a verdict on account of unseaworthiness, unless they prove by a preponderance of evidence that she was unseaworthy. But that is to be construed in connection with the charge I gave you that the fact that she ran ashore, on a still night, upon Caribou island, 17 miles out of her course, raises the presumption of unseaworthiness, which it devolves upon plaintiff to explain.' The court charged that there was but one defect in connection with the defense of unseaworthiness to which attention need be called, and that was 'the want of a proper compass.' and, among other things, said: 'It was the duty of the plaintiff to keep the Spartan in a seaworthy condition for the safe navigation of the waters in which she might be run under the policy. In order to be seaworthy, the steamer must have been supplied with a good and reliable compass or compasses, which must have been kept in proper repair and condition for the safe navigation of all waters described in the policy. If there were any defects in the compass, known or unknown, rendering it unsate or unsuitable for use in Lake Superior, and the stranding of the vessel was caused by, consequent upon, or arose from such defects in the compass, the vessel was not seaworthy for Lake Superior navigation, whatever her fitness for navigation elsewhere, and the plaintiff cannot recover. To the italicized portion of this the plaintiff excepted.
The declaration before the notary by the captain, two mates, and wheelsman states that 'from the course taken the steamer should have passed seventeen miles to the southward of Caribouisland.' The master had the words 'fogs and defective compass' inserted among the causes protested against. There was no lookout, and both that and the rate of speed were contrary to the Canadian statute. The exception of losses occasioned by unseaworthiness was, in effect, a warranty that a loss should not be so occasioned, and whether the fact of unseaworthiness were know or unknown would be immaterial. This is so stated by the learned district judge in his opinion on the motion for a new trial, and the decisions referred to fully sustain the position. Work v. Leathers, 97 U.S. 379; The Glenfruin, 10 Prob. Div. 103; Insurance Co. v. Smith, 124 U.S. 405, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534.
But the testimony of the captain and his mates leave but little, if any, room for doubt that the compass was known to be defective on former trips. The captain testified that he thought the loss was occasioe d by a defective compass, but qualified that as merely given as a supposition; that the compass was defective more or less; 'it was running in opposite courses;' that when the protest was signed he had the words 'fogs and defective compass' inserted; that the loss was occasioned by a defective compass or fogs, or the current; that he had experienced on previous trips no more variation than was general on iron vessels; that 'another compass on that vessel might be just the same and different on wooden vessels;' that the stranding must be attributed to the compass, or some other cause aboard the vessel; that all compasses on Lake Superior vary more or less at different points; that he could not tell the extent of the variation; that he discovered a little difference from some other vessels in the compass on former trips; that he found the compass out in the other channel; that every vessel he was on varied there in the same place. The first mate testified that the captain spoke to him about the defect, and said the compass was 'a little out; it was not like the compass he had on the Smith;' that the captain laid the stranding solely to the compass; and, further, that the compasses all vary up there; those that have not been adjusted, they vary more at certain points than others; a compass that is adjusted should not vary at all;' that he did know how much the variation of the compass was; that he steered the small boat by the spirit compass after the stranding, on a S. E. by E. course, and brought up 40 miles from the point for which he steered; 'the course actually run must have been 1/2 south, or something like that, judging from where she fetched up.' The second mate, when asked what took them on Caribou island, answered: 'It must have been the fault of the compass.' Patterson, the charterer's manager, said that there was more attraction on an iron than on a wooden vessel; that, to meet and obviate this, it is usual to adjust compasses; that this compass had rever been adjusted; that the Spartan had been fitted out by the plaintiff; that the compass was a little slow in its movements; that he did not know that compasses are specially adjusted to run on Lake Superior. The evidence, taken together, did not fairly leave the inquiry open as to whether, the compass did vary more than vessels' compasses ordinarily did, or whether the officers, at the time the Spartan started on the voyage, believed the compasses to be reliable, or had reason for such belief, any further than was covered by what the court said on that subject. And the slight inaccuracy in the reference to the protest is of no moment.
The eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error relate to the question of abandonment. It is not contended that there was any evidence establishing an actual acceptance of abandonment, but it is argued that the evidence tended to show a constructive acceptance. If the loss was the result of a peril not insured against, there was no right to abandon; but it is insisted that, if the abandonment is accepted it is too late to recede, and that an acceptance in ignorance that the loss was occasioned by perils not insured against would be equally binding, And this was so held by the supreme court of Michigan, (Richelieu & O. Nav. Co. v. Thames & M. Ins. Co., 40 N. W. Rep. 758,) which was an action by the present plaintiff against another of the insurers of the Spartan. But the testimony in that case, in regard to the repairs, was not the same as in the case in hand, as is conceded by plaintiff's counsel, and it is upon that very point of the repairs that the plaintiff chiefly relies to make out the alleged constructive acceptance. The 'sue and labor clause' of the policy was as follows: 'It is agreed that the acts of the insured or the insurers, or their agents, in recovering, saving, and preserving the property insured, in case of disaster, shall not be considered a waiver or an acceptance of an abandonment, nor as affirming or denying any lib ility under this policy, but such acts shall be considered as done for the benefit of all concerned, and without prejudice to the rights of either party.' The bill of exceptions shows that the officers and crew of the steamer were unable to get her off, and notice was sent to the owners and charterer, and notice of the loss was also communicated to the underwriters, with a request for assistance, and the underwriters sent a wrecking expedition, under the command of Capt. Swain, to rescue the steamer. The request for assistance, was received June 22d, and the wrecking expedition left Detroit June 23d, and reached the Spartan June 25th. The telegraphic notice of abandonment was sent to the underwriters on June 26th. The policy provided that in case of loss or misfortune it should be lawful and necessary for the assured 'to make all reasonable exertions in and about the defense, safeguard, and recovery of the said vessel, or any part thereof, without prejudice to this insurance;' and, in case of neglect or refusal on the part of the insured to adopt such measures, 'then the said insurers may and are hereby authorized to interpose and recover the said vessel.' Capt. Swain, who had command of the wrecking expedition, testified that he had no orders where to take the steamer when she was got off, and he and the first mate agreed in testimony that she was towed to Detroit under the orders of her master. The captain denied that he gave such orders. The survey was held by Gibson, acting for the underwriters, and Kirby for the charterer. The superintendent of the dry-dock testified that the dock was engaged by the captain, 'who had something to do with ordering the repairs, and it appeared that by direction of officers of the charterer work was done not made necessary by the stranding. The captain testified that he directed the repairs, because Gibson told him both need not be there, and that after Crosby, the agent of the underwriters, told him to keep a strict supervision over the work; that he received no instructions from any person representing the plaintiff or the charterer. Crosby's evidence was that he gave no orders or instructions to any person or persons as to the repairs on the steamer, nor did he assume any responsibility therefor. He did tell the captain to be careful 'to keep what is in the survey separate from what is outside.' There was a dispute between the plaintiff's manager the charterer's treasurer, the captain, and Crosby about the payment of duties charged by the Canadian government on the repairs. And as late as March 24, 1884, these duties and the fact that the repairs included work not specified in the survey, still divided the parties; nor from June 26th to the date of the proofs of loss, November 3d, was there any claim of total loss made, nor did such seem to be the attitude of the parties until defendant refused to pay.
In Richelieu & O. Nav. Co. v. Thames & M. Ins. Co., supra, the supreme court of Michigan, in a careful opinion, held that the company could not defend on the ground that the peril and loss were not insured against, because, as found by the jury in that case, the abandonment had been accepted. The plaintiff there rested its case entirely upon the acceptance of the abandonment of the vessel, and the evidence upon that question was, for some reason, largely different from the evidence on this tral. The court, in this case left the question of abandonment to the jury, and the finding was against the plaintiff. No reference is made, in the opinion, on the motion for a new trial, to this question, though it is stated that the opinion 'covers all the points made in the briefs of counsel.' But certain rulings of the court in relation to this subject are questioned by the alleged errors under consideration. 'Whether the insurer accepts or not is a matter of construction of his words and conduct. Any act done for the purpose of making the most of the property, to whomsoever it may prove to belong, ought, not to be construed against the party wo thus consults the common interest.' 2 Phil. Ins. §§ 1692, 1693. Any act of the underwriter in consequence of an abandonment, which could be justified only under a right derived from it, may be decisive evidence of an acceptance. Peele v. Insurance Co., 3 Mason, 27; Insurance Co. v. Younger, 2 Curt. 322. The question for the jury was whether upon the evidence, taken in connection with the provisions of the policy, there were any such acts.
As it is not contended that there was any evidence of actual acceptance, and as it clearly appeared that the rescuing expedition was sent before the telegraphic notice of abandonment was given, and as the evidence did not tend to show that that expedition was sent with the intention of rescuing 'and repairing' the Spartan, or that the insurers brought the Spartan to Detroit, (if they did bring her,) with the intention of 'repairing her,' each one of the requested instructions was objectionable. Assuming that an offered abandonment may be accepted even when the assured has no right to abandon, and that taking possession to make partial repairs, not amounting to indemnity, may not be authorized by the policy, and that taking possession of and holding a vessel for an unreasonable time or taking possession after a peremptory abandonment, without qualification or reservation, are such acts as imply and constitute an acceptance of the abandonment and liability for total loss, and that by the abandonment and acceptance the whole interest is transferred to the underwriters, (Copelin v. Insurance Co., 9 Wall. 461; Shepherd v. Henderson, L. R. 7 App. Cas. 49; Northwestern Transp. Co. v. Thames & M. Ins. Co., 59 Mich. 214, 26 N. W. Rep. 336; Insurance Co. v. Bakewell, 4 B. Mon. 541; Reynolds v. Insurance surance Co., 22 Pick. 191,) the question still remains, what the facts really are in respect to the conduct of the underwriters. The plaintiff insists that although the captain moved the Spartan to Detroit, and placed her in the dry-dock, and to some extent, if not wholly, superintended the repairs, the plaintiff was not bound by his action, because he was not employed by it but by the charterer, and that the master, after abandonment, becomes the agent of the insurers. But it is only after a valid abandonment, and the passage of the title, that the captain thus becomes the insurers agent, and to concede that here begs the very question which was at issue. 2 Phil. Ins. § 1732. The first and second errors were that the court ruled that no authority was shown on the part of Capt. Gibson to bind the defendant in respect to the repairs made upon the Spartan, and in striking out the testimony respecting Gibson's acts and statements. Crosby, who was the agent of the insurance company at Buffalo, testified that he 'gave no orders or instructions to any person or persons whatsoever as to the repairs on the steamer, nor did he assume any responsibility therefor; that he sent Gibson to Detroit to act on the survey on the Spartan, and afterwards sent him to see that no more repairs were put on the steamer than were called for by the survey, as the Spartan had been damaged on previous occasions and not properly repaired;' and, further, that 'Mr. Gibson was sent by the insurers from Buffalo to hold a survey on the steamer before she was repaired.' This is all the evidence bearing on Gibson's authority, and the court was justified in its action. Why Gibson was not called as a witness does not appear.
It is urged, thirdly, that the court erred in excluding the question put to the witness Patterson: 'What is the custom of Canadian vessels about carrying a lookout forward?' The Canadian statute provided that every steamer should, in a fog, mist, or falling snow, go at a moderate speed, and that nothing in the rules prescribed should exonerate any ship, or the owner, or master, or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to keep a proper lookout, etc. In The Farragut, 10 Wall. 334, 338, it was held that the rule laid down by cog ress to the same effect intimated that the lookout was one of the ordinary precautions which a careful navigation involved; and Mr. Justice BRADLEY, delivering the opinion of the court, said: 'A lookout is only one of the many precautions which a prudent navigator ought to provide; but it is not indispensable where, from the circumstances of the case, a lookout could not possibly be of any service.' Evidence of a custom to run at full speed in a dense fog, without a lookout, and contrary to the statute, would be clearly inadmissible, and would be of no avail if established.
It is also objected that the protest was admitted in evidence. That protest consists of the statement signed by the master, mates, and wheeslman, and the declaration of the notary that he protests at the request of the master, as well on his own behalf as on the behalf of the owners, freighters, officers, and crew, against all and singular the cause and causes operating as aforesaid, etc., and more especially 'against the storm and heavy winds and gales, high and dangerous seas, fogs, and defective compass, experienced on her late voyage;' all of which is certified by the notary public as being a true copy filed in his office. Undoubtedly the protest of the captain, so long as he was living, would not be evidence on one side or the other, unless to contradict him if he varied from it; and it is said in 2 Arn. Ins. (2d Ed. by Perkins,) 1353, that it would not be made evidence as against the assured, if the brokers showed it to the underwriters with other papers relating to the loss on demand of payment. But it was admissible in this case, not on the ground of agency, but because it was made part of the proofs of loss, being directly referred to in the proofs in the statement that the vessel ran ashore, 'and became a wreck and total loss, and was duly abandoned by the owners to her insurers, as will appear by certified copy of the protest of her master and mariners, heretofore served upon you.' Hence the admission of the proofs of loss involved the admission of the explanatory writing. Insurance Co. v. Newton, 22 Wall. 32.
Finally, it is said the court erred in excluding the record in a suit instituted by the dry-dock company against the Spartan to enforce a lien for the repairs, because the record was admissible to show the amount due to the dry-dock company, and also to show that the steamer was sold to satisfy the decree in that suit, and thereby to establish a constructive acceptance of abandonment by the insurers; but we do not think that it was admissible on either ground. The insurers were not parties to that suit, and the cost of the repairs and the amount of the loss were properly shown by other and competent evidence, while the sale of the vessel had no tendency to prove the acceptance of the abandonment, but rather that the underwriters did not consider themselves bound in the premises. The result is that the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.
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