The Emancipation of South America/Chapter 10
CHAPTER X.
THE SPY SYSTEM OF THE PATRIOTS.
1815—1816.
The restoration of royalty in Chile was attended with such excesses as might have been expected had some foreign power triumphed over the country. A system of blood and fire was established for its pacification, which had the natural result of reanimating the spirit of resistance. The great majority of the people were tired of war, and failed to see that revolutionary anarchy was any improvement on colonial despotism; they were anxious only for peace, and welcomed their conqueror as a liberator. A moderate policy might have consolidated Spanish power in Chile for a considerable time, but these excesses fanned into a blaze the embers of the old patriotic spirit, which was buried under the ashes of Rancagua.
Osorio was by nature inclined to clemency, but the instructions of Viceroy Abascal prohibited him from adopting any such course, and the Spaniards who surrounded him urged upon him the necessity of the most severe measures of repression. Yielding to these influences he became the instrument of a pitiless persecution, the result of which was to arouse the spirit of insurrection in every Chilian heart.
Forced loans and arbitrary contributions formed the sources of his revenue, and so crushed all industry that soon even these sources dried up, and supplies could only be obtained by confiscations. All the civilizing reforms of the revolutionary epoch were abolished, and the old monopolies were re-established. The most distinguished patriots were exiled to the island of Juan Fernandez; all the native inhabitants were classified as "suspects," and many were murdered in the prisons by the soldiery. A new spirit of patriotism was engendered by misery and despair. Spaniards again became a privileged class, they occupied all the public offices, they alone were allowed to carry arms, their testimony only was received in the courts. Every native Chilian had to be in his own house at nine o'clock at night, and could not travel even the shortest distance without a permit. Fights between the soldiery and the "rotos," as the men of the labouring class are called, were of daily occurrence. Many men of the Talavera regiment, which was particularly obnoxious, were murdered by the populace. Even the Chilian troops, which had done such good service under Sanchez and other leaders, were most thanklessly treated. Commissions won by their officers on the field of battle were not recognised, their pay was scanty, and the pensions of their widows were not paid at all.
At the commencement of 1815 Osorio had 5,000 men, perfectly armed and equipped, under his orders. His instructions were, as soon as he had pacified the country, to cross the Andes with 3,000 men, and to act in Cuyo and Cordoba in combination with Pezuela. Abascal had the converse of the same idea, which was later on carried out by San Martin. Small bodies of armed men had frequently crossed the Andes, but it is not the number of the troops employed, nor the power of the peoples in conflict, which constitutes the fame of such achievements; that fame lies in their motives and results. In this lay the importance of the passage of the Alps by Hannibal and by Napoleon; and the passage of the Andes by San Martin and by Bolívar, are famous as parts of a great scheme for the emancipation of a continent. Osorio was not the man for such an enterprise, and his force was so weakened by detachments in aid of Pezuela, that he never attempted it.
The disasters suffered by the Patriots in this year were not fruitless; time was gained, in which San Martin perfected his preparations, and this he lengthened by entering into a correspondence with Osorio, proposing some arrangement for the prevention of further bloodshed. He also took advantage of the correspondence so established to set on foot an extensive system of spies and secret agents all over Chile, by whose means he propagated false intelligence of such great military preparations in Mendoza as filled Osorio with fears of an immediate invasion, and had still more effect upon the feebler spirit of Marcó del Pont, who relieved him of the command in December.
The secret agents, who rendered the greatest service to San Martin, he found among the Chilian refugees in Mendoza. When the talents or social position of any of these men inspired him with confidence, he put them under arrest on some charge of treachery, from which he aided them to escape and fly across the Andes, "from his tyranny." Their alleged sufferings disarmed the suspicions of the Spanish rulers of Chile to the extent that some of them were actually employed by them to procure information from the eastern side of the Andes. By their help San Martin discovered that several Spaniards in Mendoza held secret communications with Osorio. He arrested them, and by threats of immediate execution, compelled them to show him all the letters they received, and to return answers dictated by him. His principal care was to persuade the Spaniards that the projected expedition would attack the south of Chile, in order to induce them to relax their vigilance in the quarter which was really menaced, and to concentrate their troops in positions where they could be of no service.
His agents were incessantly occupied in furnishing him with details concerning the number, armament, and positions of the Royalist forces, and in stirring up the Chilian people to co-operate with the invading army. Thus the whole country was soon on the watch for the moment when their liberators would pass the Andes. The name of San Martin became so popular, that his agents had no difficulty in obtaining all the help they needed; horses were always to be had when they wanted them, and they were warned in time of any danger which threatened them.
Chilian patriots, among whom the most active was Manuel Rodriguez, also secretly organised bands of volunteers, who waited but the signal to rise in arms. Some of them gave their lives for the cause on the gallows. Marcó del Pont adopted the most severe measures of repression, which only served to fan the flame of discontent.
In September, 1816, Rodriguez imprudently raised the flag of insurrection in the south of Chile. His raw troops were speedily dispersed, but San Martin made good use of his mistake by writing him an angry despatch, telling him that he had ruined his plans by drawing the Royalist forces to the south and causing them to occupy the passes by which he had hoped to cross the Cordillera. This despatch he caused to fall into the hands of Marcó del Pont, whose attention was thus again diverted from the real point of danger.
At this time Brown, the gallant Irishman who had driven the Spanish naval forces from the River Plate, and had been rewarded by the gift of his flagship, the Hercules, again offered his ship and his services to the Argentine Government. He was well supplied with guns, small arms, and ammunition, and was granted letters of marque as a privateer. On the 15th October, 181 5, he sailed from Buenos Ayres for the Pacific with Captain Buchardo, a Frenchman, as his second in command. His squadron consisted of four vessels — the Hercules of 20 guns, commanded by Michael Brown; the Trinidad of 16 guns, commanded by Walter Chitty; the Halcon, commanded by Buchardo, which three vessels were brigs; and the armed quetch Uribe, named after its commander, a Chilian, who had been a colleague of Carrera in the late revolution. The crews of the two first were almost entirely English. The Halcon had a mixed crew of Chilians and Argentines, and her marines were commanded by Ramon Freyre. The crew of the quetch were all Chilians, and she carried a black flag as a sign of no quarter. It was stipulated that any prizes they might make should be sold in Buenos Ayres, one-ninth the prize money to go to Government, two-ninths to the Commodore, and the rest was to be divided among the officers and crews.
San Martin took care to inform Marcó of this expedition by means of his secret agents, and at the same time spread through Chile a rumour that an army from 4,000 to 7,000 men was assembled in Mendoza for the passage of the Andes. Marcó, terrified at the idea of being attacked both by land and sea, issued the most injudicious orders to his subordinates, scattered his forces, and applied to the Viceroy for naval support.
The Hercules and the Trinidad, in the attempt to double Cape Horn, were driven into the Straits of Magellan by a tempest, where they both received serious injury from sunken rocks, but, being repaired, reached the barren island of Mocha in the Southern Sea, where they were joined by the Halcon. The quetch was wrecked, the captain and master being drowned. Brown with his two ships, and Buchardo with his one, then sailed by different courses to Callao, where they reunited to blockade the port, and captured two large prizes, one of which, the Consequencia was armed and added to the squadron. On the 21st January, 1816, they sailed boldly into the harbour, and forced the Spanish ships to take refuge under the guns of the batteries.
On the night of the 22nd the gallant Commodore attacked the Royalist flotilla with five armed boats, but was beaten off with a loss of thirty killed and wounded. After maintaining the blockade for three weeks, they sailed for Guayaquil. The fort at the entrance to this port was taken by assault by Freyre with the crew of the Halcon, who effected a landing under the fire of the guns of the squadron. The Commodore then entered the port with the Trinidad, captured a schooner carrying marines, and took the first battery with four brass guns, which were transferred to the schooner. He then attacked another battery, but a sudden squall drove the Trinidad ashore, and he was forced to haul down his flag to prevent the massacre of his men by the Spanish infantry. He himself stripped off his clothes and sprang overboard intending to swim to the schooner, but seeing that the Spaniards were commencing to kill their prisoners, he climbed on board again, seized a lighted match, ran down to the magazine, and threatened to blow up the ship with all on board unless the laws of war were respected. This daring action brought the Spaniards to their senses, the slaughter was stopped, and Brown, with no other clothing than the Argentine flag which he wrapped round him, was led a prisoner on shore.
Buchardo, with the rest of the squadron, attacked another battery in the hope of rescuing his comrades, but was beaten off. One of the prisoners taken on the Consequencia off Callao was Mendiburo, the Governor of this province, and the commandant of Guayaquil was so eager to get rid of his enemies that he proposed an exchange of prisoners, which was at once accepted. The three remaining vessels with the schooner then left the port.
On the open sea the jealousy latent in the hearts of the two commanders broke into an open flame. Each of these two adventurers considered that the other deserved hanging at the yardarm; but in times of danger they had most nobly supported each other. Now they agreed to separate, dividing the plunder between them, and Buchardo returned with the Consequencia to Buenos Ayres. Brown sailed on to Santa Fé in New Granada, but, finding that city occupied by Royalist troops, he followed his late comrade to the Atlantic.
The Argentine Government had hoped great things from this expedition, and had written to San Martin to hold himself ready to take advantage of any movement it might occasion in Chile; but the astute general replied that a naval force, to be of any effective aid to an invading general, must consist of ships of war, not of privateers, and must be under his orders. The result showed that it was but of slight service to the cause, and was a waste of material which might have been much more usefully employed.