The Rock Island Bridge

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The Rock Island Bridge
by Stephen Johnson Field
Syllabus
715798The Rock Island Bridge — SyllabusStephen Johnson Field
Court Documents

United States Supreme Court

73 U.S. 213

The Rock Island Bridge

THIS was a libel filed in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, against that part of the Rock Island Railroad Bridge which is situated in the Northern District of Illinois, for alleged damages done by that part of the bridge to two steamboats, the property of the libellant, employed in the navigation of the Mississippi River. It alleged that, by law and the public treaties of the United States, the Mississippi River is, for the distance of two thousand miles, a public navigable stream and common highway, free and open to all the citizens of the United States, who are entitled to navigate the same by sailing and steam vessels, and otherwise, without impediment or obstruction; that the Rock Island Bridge obstructed the free navigation of the stream; and that by collision with this obstruction the steam vessels of the libellant had been injured, and that he had in consequence been damaged to an extent exceeding seventy thousand dollars.

In accordance with the prayer of the libel, process was issued and the property attached. The Mississippi and Missouri Railroad Company and others then intervened as claimants, and filed an exception to the jurisdiction of the court to proceed against the property in question in the manner 'in which the same is sought to be proceeded against by the libel.' In other words, they objected to the jurisdiction of the court to take a proceeding in rem against the property. The exception was sustained by the District and Circuit Courts, and the libel dismissed. The correctness of this ruling was the sole question presented for the determination of this court.


Messrs. Arrington and Rae, in support of the jurisdiction:


The jurisdiction of the American admiralty extends to all cases of tort committed on navigable waters. It may be said that the bridge is attached to, and is a part of the land; that it is like a wharf, and can no more be libelled than it. This is not so. A wharf is the shore. A bridge is not a shore. A bridge is like a vessel,-over or no the stream. A floating bridge would be within the admiralty jurisdiction: a bridge aground must be so also. When the termini rest upon either shore, the bridge is not more attached to the soil than a vessel chained to the shore. The shore, in either case, is but the incident.

To make the admiralty jurisdiction depend upon subject-matter and not upon locality, would lead to a perplexing confusion of ideas. The principle of jurisdiction of cases of tort ought to depend upon place, not upon the object affected. Like crime, it is essentially local. In The Volant, [1] Dr. Lushington says that the jurisdiction 'does not depend upon the existence of the ship, but upon the origin of the questions to be decided, and the locality.'

Mr. B. B. Cook, contra.

Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:

Notes[edit]

  1. 1 W. Robinson, 3 8.

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).

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