United States v. Alire/Opinion of the Court
The only question presented in the record, which we shall examine, is whether or not the court below had jurisdiction of the cause.
It will be seen by reference to the two acts of Congress on this subject, that the only judgments which the Court of Claims are authorized to render against the government, or over which the Supreme Court have any jurisdiction on appeal, or for the payment of which by the Secretary of the Treasury any provision is made, are judgments for money found due from the government to the petitioner. And, although it is true that the subject-matter over which jurisdiction is conferred, both in the act of 1855 and of 1863, woud admit of a much more extended cognizance of cases, yet it is quite clear that the limited power given to render a judgment necessarily restrains the general terms, and confines the subject-matter to cases in which the petitioner sets up a moneyed demand as due from the government.
This view is confirmed by the judgment of this court in the case of Gordon, Adm'r, v. United States, [1] in which the court denied any jurisdiction over the case on account of the power of the executive department over its judgment by the fourteenth section of the act of 1863. That section was repealed by the first section of the act of March 17th, 1866.
The decree, or judgment, in the present case is, that the claimant recover of the government a military land warrant for one hundred and sixty acres of land, and that it be made out and delivered to the said Julian Alire by the proper officer, and the decree to be certified and remitted to the Secretary of the Interior. We find no provision in any of the statutes requiring a judgment of this character, whether in this court or in the Court of Claims, to be obeyed or satisfied. Nor does either court possess any authority to render such a judgment, as is apparent from a perusal of the seventh section of the act of 1863, and which is the only one providing for the rendition of a judgment or decree in any case before the court below.
Even if the first section of the act of 1855 and the second of 1863 could be construed as giving a jurisdiction in cases other than money demands against the government, no judgment could be rendered by the court below, and, of consequence, the carrying into effect their finding must depend on the act of 1855. But we are of opinion that it was intended by the several provisions of the act of 1863 that the cases to be heard were to pass into a judgment as prescribed in the seventh section of the latter act, and hence they must be such in their nature and character as may admit of a judgment or decree in conformity with its provisions.
Our conclusion is, the court below had no jurisdiction of this case, and that the decree must be reversed, and the cause remanded to the court with directions to enter a decree dismissing the petition.
A motion was subsequently made on the part of the United States to reinstate on the docket this cause, dismissed as above stated at this term (on the ground that it did not appear that the amount in controversy exceeded $3000), and to remand it to the Court of Claims with a view to an amended or special appeal under the fifth section of the act of March 3d, 1863, [2] which provides 'that when the judgment or decree will affect a class of cases or furnish a precedent for the future action of any executive department of the government in the adjustment of such class of cases, . . . and such facts shall be certified to by the presiding justice of the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court shall entertain an appeal on behalf of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.'
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
The case involves the right of the claimant to a military bounty land warrant under the acts of Congress passed March 3d, 1855, and May 14th, 1856, which claim had been rejected by the commissioner of pensions, and the rejection confirmed by the Secretary of the Interior. The case would seem to fall within the provision providing for a special appeal on behalf of the government. We see no valid objection to the motion, and therefore direct the cause to be reinstated on the docket, and the record remanded back to the Court of Claims for such further proceedings as may seem fit and proper in the cause as it respects the appeal prayed for.
REMANDED ACCORDINGLY.
Notes[edit]
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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