Wells v. Rockefeller/Dissent White

by Byron White

United States Supreme Court

394 U.S. 542

Wells  v.  Rockefeller

 Argued: Jan. 13, 1969. --- Decided: April 7, 1969

Mr. Justice WHITE, dissenting.

I have consistently joined the Court's opinions which establish as one of the ground rules for legislative districting that single member districts should be substantially equal in population. I would not now dissent if the Court's present judgments represented a measurable contribution to the ends whic I had thought the Court was pursuing in this area, or even if I thought the opinions not very useful but not harmful either. With all due respect, however, I am firmly convinced that the Court's new rulings are unduly rigid and unwarranted applications of the Equal Protection Clause which will unnecessarily involve the courts in the abrasive task of drawing district lines.

Accepting for constitutional purposes that a State may assign the task of apportioning its legislature or congressional delegation to the legislature itself, I would not quibble with the legislative judgment if variations between districts were acceptably small. And I would be willing to establish a population variation figure which if not exceeded would normally not call for judicial intervention. As a rule of thumb, a variation between the largest and the smallest district of no more than 10% to 15% would satisfy me, absent quite unusual circumstances not present in any of these cases. At the very least, at this trivial level, I would be willing to view state explanations of the variance with a more tolerant eye.

This would be far more reasonable than the Court's demand for an absolute but illusory equality or for an apportionment plan which approaches this goal so nearly that no other plan can be suggested which would come nearer. As Mr. Justice FORTAS demonstrates, the 1960 census figures were far from accurate when they were compiled by professional enumerators and statisticians bent on precision, in 1960. Massive growth and shifts in population since 1960 made the 1960 figures even more inaccurate by 1967. That is why a new census is taken every 10 years. When the Court finds a 3% variation from substantially inexact figures constitutionally impermissible it is losing perspective and sticking at a trifle.

It also seems arbitrary for the majority to discard the suggestion of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), that if a legislature seeks an apportionment plan which respects the boundaries of political subdivisions, some variations from absolute equality would be constitutionally permissible. Of course, Reynolds involved state legislative apportionment and took pains to say that there may be more leeway in that context. But the Court invokes Reynolds today and in no way distinguishes federal from state districting.

Reynolds noted that '(i)ndiscriminate districting, without any regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering.' 377 U.S., at 578-579, 84 S.Ct., at 1390. The Court nevertheless now rules that regard for these boundaries is no justification for districts which vary no more than 3% from the norm where another plan which may have no regard for district lines reduces the variation to an even smaller figure. I have similar objections to the Court's rejection of geographical compactness as an acceptable justification for minor variations among congressional districts. This rejection of the virtues of compactness will not be lost on those who would use congressional and legislative districting to bury their political opposition.

In reality, of course, districting is itself a gerrymandering in the sense that it represents a complex blend of political, economic, regional, and historical considerations. In terms of the gerrymander, the situation will not be much different if equality means what it literally says-a zero variation-rather than only 'substantial' equality which would countenance some variations among legislative districts. Either standard will prevent a minority of the population or a minority party from consistently controlling the state legislature or a congressional delegation, and both are powerful forces toward equalizing voter influence on legislative performance. In terms of effective representation for all voters there are only minuscule differences between the two standards. But neither rule can alone prevent de iberate partisan gerrymandering if that is considered an evil which the Fourteenth Amendment should attempt to proscribe.

Today's decisions on the one hand require precise adherence to admittedly inexact census figures, and on the other downgrade a restraint on a far greater potential threat to equality of representation, the gerrymander. Legislatures intent on minimizing the representation of selected political or racial groups are invited to ignore political boundaries and compact districts so long as they adhere to population equality among districts using standards which we know and they know are sometimes quite incorrect. I see little merit in such a confusion of priorities.

Moreover, today's decisions will lead to an unnecessary intrusion of the judiciary into legislative business. It would be one thing if absolute equality were possible. But, admittedly, it is not. The Court may be groping for a cleancut, per se rule which will minimize confrontations between courts and legislatures while also satisfying the Fourteenth Amendment. If so, the Court is wide of the mark. Today's results simply shift the area of dispute a few percentage points down the scale; the courts will now be engaged in quibbling disputes over such questions as whether a plan with a 1% variation is 'better' than one with a larger variation, say 1.1% or even 2%. If county and municipal boundaries are to be ignored, a computer can produce countless plans for absolute population equality, one differing very little from another, but each having its own very different political ramifications. Ultimately, the courts may be asked to decide whether some families in an apartment house should vote in one district and some in another, if that would come closer to the standard of apparent equality. Using the spacious language of the Equal Protection Clause to inject the courts into these minor squabbles is an unacceptable pre-emption of the legislative function. Not only will the Court's new rule necessarily precipitate a new round of congressional and legislative districting, but also I fear that in the long run the courts, rather than the legislatures or nonpartisan commissions, will be making most of the districting decisions in the several States. Since even at best, with compact and equal districts, the final boundary lines unavoidably have significant political repercussions, the courts should not draw district lines themselves unnecessarily. I therefore dissent.

Notes