WEIHAIWEI.
EIHAIWEI was probably first brought to the notice of the British naval and military authorities at the time of the Anglo-French Expedition of 1860. The possibility of making use of Weihaiwei was then considered, and in his "Narrative of the War with China in 1860," General Wolseley gives an interesting account of his visit to the place with a view to testing its resources. First impressions are proverbially deceptive, and those of the gallant General are no exception to the rule. He wrote: "The harbour is a bad one, being open both to the north-east and south-east winds, so that the nautical portion of the expedition did not look upon it with very loving eyes.… Towards noon all returned, having failed to discover any running water, and even wells were found to be scarce.… What strikes one as so strange in a country essentially agricultural is the small number of birds to be seen; even the universally-met-with sparrow is, comparatively speaking, seldom found here, and if swallows are necessary to 'make a summer' one might almost doubt the existence of such a season in these regions. Unlike the towns in the south, there were but very few pigs or dogs.… The great scarcity of water appeared to check even animal fecundity." "The Island of Lung-meau-Loweah (sic), which shelters the harbour on the east side," also seems to have been waterless. How very inaccurate these statements were and how unwise it is to make dogmatic assertions of this nature, based on a few hours' cursory and perfunctory survey, is amply shown in the subsequent history of Weihaiwei. Admiral Freemantle, who was Commander-in-Chief on the China Station for three years, writing to The Times, in February, 1902, stated: "Personally, I have always thought Weihaiwei well suited to our wants. It is admirably situated, the harbour is good and capable of improvement.… For our purpose Weihaiwei is a far more valuable possession than Kiao-chou or Port Arthur.… We are about to develop Weihaiwei as a commercial port, under an energetic colonial administrator, and I venture to prophesy that a few years hence our interests there will have increased to such an extent that it will be necessary to take some defensive measures."
Weihaiwei, like Port Arthur, formed one of the "twin gates" of the Pechili Gulf, and both places were strongly fortified by the Chinese Government with the aid of foreign military experts. When the Chino-Japanese War of 1895 broke out Japanese strategists at once recognised the necessity of reducing both fortresses as preliminary steps to the invasion of the metropolitan province. In fact it was the surrender of Admiral Ting at Weihaiwei, following on the fall of Port Arthur, that convinced the Chinese of the futility of further resistance. In this short war the one redeeming feature in the sorry exhibition of Chinese impotence was the heroic, if hopeless, defence of Liu-kung-tao and the harbour by the naval forces of China. The garrisons of various forts on the mainland in most instances deserted en masse. Had the army offered anything like the resistance shown by the sister service, a very different complexion might have been put upon the war. The army of Japan numbered nearly twenty-five thousand troops and there is no evidence to show that either the invaders or the besieged garrison had any difficulty in obtaining water of excellent quality.
Weihaiwei remained in the possession of the Japanese for more than two years. On payment of the final instalment of the war indemnity it was surrendered in 1898 to the Chinese Government, who promptly transferred it to Great Britain, "for so long a period as Port Arthur remains in the occupation of Russia," and "in order to provide Great Britain with a suitable naval harbour in North China, and for the better protection of British commerce in the neighbouring seas."
It was at first intended that under the British flag Weihaiwei should out-rival Port Arthur and Tsingtau as a naval base and fortress harbour. Royal Engineers planned batteries on Liu-kung-tao, one or two of which were practically finished. The foundations of a naval hospital were laid, and the building materials were collected. The 1st Chinese Regiment was also established to garrison the Colony. Unfortunately, however, for Weihaiwei the enormous cost of the Boer war compelled economy in other directions, and a complete change took place in the British official attitude towards our newest Eastern possession. This change was announced in the following passage from the Colonial Office List, 1902:—"It is not the present intention of His Majesty's Government to re-fortify the station, but to retain it as a flying naval base, and as a depôt and drill-ground and sanatorium for the China Squadron in North China."
The Chinese Regiment was established in the early days of British tenure (1899). At that time Russia, Germany, and England laid claim, respectively, to Manchuria, Shantung, and the Yangtsze Valley, as "spheres of influence," and it seemed very probable that a partition of the dominions of the "sick man" of the Far East would eventually take place. Our War Office, with commendable foresight, intended the Chinese Regiment to be, not merely the garrison of Weihaiwei but also the nucleus of the body of military police which would be needed if, and when, we
