he faithfully adhered to it. In view of the attitude of the authorities the fleet was ordered to assemble at the Peiho River, and with it went a body of troops from the garrison at Canton. When Mr. Bruce arrived off the Peiho, on June 20th, he found a substantial portion of the China squadron under its new commander, Admiral Hope, awaiting him there. Communication had already been opened up with the shore, but with very discouraging results. The passage of the river was found to be barred by a row of iron stakes backed by a formidable boom, and the British boat's crew were warned not to land by an armed and angry crowd. A second attempt to get into touch with the officials elicited an even more uncompromising display of hostility, and was equally unsuccessful. The attitude assumed by the Chinese was felt to leave no alternative to a forcing of the defences. The belief entertained at the British headquarters was that if this were successfully accomplished, and a landing effected, the local officials would be disowned and there would be no further opposition to the passage of the mission to Peking. It was a theory which the previous history of British relations with China justified. But Admiral Hope and Mr. Bruce had reckoned without the spirit of courage which, despite all that detractors may say, is to be found in the Chinese soldiery when properly handled and led. They had not long to wait for a display of this quality. When the attack commenced on the 25th of June, the British ships, on reaching the boom, were subjected to a destructive fire from the forts. Four of the British force of eleven vessels engaged the forts at close quarters, and a fierce tight was waged for the best part of three hours. The fire from the forts then slackened, but the British ships had been so badly damaged that they were unable to take advantage of the lessened resistance. On drawing off it was found that three of the gunboats were in a sinking condition, while there was not a unit in the squadron which had escaped severe injury. The check, it was thought, might be retrieved by a demonstration on land, and the force of marines and engineers which had been sent up from Hongkong was told off to attempt the capture of the forts by storm. The enterprise proved to be an even greater failure than the sea attack. The men were galled by a dropping fire from the forts on landing, and after struggling on against hopeless odds for some time they were withdrawn. The net result of the day's disasters was a loss of three hundred men killed and wounded, and a crippled squadron. Over and above this was the damaging effect which the British reverse was calculated to have on the situation in China. Altogether it was one of the worst days' work to the British account since their first connection with China.
After the fight Mr. Bruce withdrew to Shanghai and Admiral Hope sent his ships to points where he thought they might be useful in the event of anti-foreign ebullitions. A serious outbreak at Shanghai which resulted in the death of two Englishmen, and disturbances at the other Treaty ports showed that the precaution was a prudent one. In point of fact the Taku defeat, doubtless magnified beyond all recognition, had given a dangerous stimulus to the lawless and ultra patriotic element of the Chinese populace. The unrest was the more marked as it was impossible to do anything immediately to wipe out the memory of the rebuff. The Home Government naturally had to decide in the important crisis that had arisen, and as those were days when cable communication was unknown, months necessarily elapsed before their views were known. The decision they took, it would seem with considerable reluctance, was to despatch a military expedition to enforce the realisation of the objects of British policy. It was not until November, 1859, that the arrangements for the new movement were matured. Then it was announced that a joint plan of action had been discussed and agreed upon between France and England, and that the military expedition that was to be sent out would occupy the island of Chusan as an advanced base for the contemplated operations in the Gulf of Pechili.
The new expedition was conceived on a more formidable scale than any that had ever been sent to China to enforce foreign demands. The British force consisted of ten thousand men, afterwards increased to thirteen thousand, mainly drafted from India. The French contingent numbered about six thousand men of all arms. In addition to this large land force there was a powerful naval squadron representing the combined strength in Far Eastern waters of
