Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS PUB 186-2
(+Change Notice)
FEDERAL INFORMATION
PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION
2000 January 27
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology
DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD (DSS)
CATEGORY: COMPUTER SECURITY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, William M. Daley, Secretary
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY,
Raymond G. Kammer, Director
Foreword
The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Series of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is the official series of publications relating to standards and guidelines adopted and promulgated under the provisions of Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-106), and the Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235). These mandates have given the Secretary of Commerce and NIST important responsibilities for improving the utilization and management of computer and related telecommunications systems in the Federal Government. The NIST, through its Information Technology Laboratory, provides leadership, technical guidance, and coordination of Government efforts in the development of standards and guidelines in these areas.
Comments concerning Federal Information Processing Standards Publications are welcomed and should be addressed to the Director, Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Dr. Stop 8900, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900.
William Mehuron, Director
Information Technology Laboratory
Abstract
This standard specifies a suite of algorithms which can be used to generate a digital signature. Digital signatures are used to detect unauthorized modifications to data and to authenticate the identity of the signatory. In addition, the recipient of signed data can use a digital signature in proving to a third party that the signature was in fact generated by the signatory. This is known as nonrepudiation since the signatory cannot, at a later time, repudiate the signature.
Key words: ADP security, computer security, digital signatures, public-key cryptography, Federal Information Processing Standards.
Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 186-2
2000 January 27
Announcing the
DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD (DSS)
Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS PUBS) are issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) after approval by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-106), and the Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235).
Name of Standard: Digital Signature Standard (DSS).
Category of Standard: Computer Security, Cryptography.
Explanation: This Standard specifies algorithms appropriate for applications requiring a digital, rather than written, signature. A digital signature is represented in a computer as a string of binary digits. A digital signature is computed using a set of rules and a set of parameters such that the identity of the signatory and integrity of the data can be verified. An algorithm provides the capability to generate and verify signatures. Signature generation makes use of a private key to generate a digital signature. Signature verification makes use of a public key which corresponds to, but is not the same as, the private key. Each user possesses a private and public key pair. Public keys are assumed to be known to the public in general. Private keys are never shared. Anyone can verify the signature of a user by employing that user's public key. Signature generation can be performed only by the possessor of the user's private key.
A hash function is used in the signature generation process to obtain a condensed version of data, called a message digest (see Figure 1). The message digest is then input to the digital signature (ds) algorithm to generate the digital signature. The digital signature is sent to the intended verifier along with the signed data (often called the message). The verifier of the message and signature verifies the signature by using the sender's public key. The same hash function must also be used in the verification process. The hash function is specified in a separate standard, the Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS 180-1. FIPS approved ds algorithms must be implemented with the SHS. Similar procedures may be used to generate and verify signatures for stored as well as transmitted data.
Approving Authority: Secretary of Commerce.
Maintenance Agency: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Information Technology Laboratory (ITL).
Applicability: This standard is applicable to all Federal departments and agencies for the protection of sensitive unclassified information that is not subject to section 2315 of Title 10, United States Code, or section 3502(2) of Title 44, United States Code. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing public-key based signature systems that Federal departments and agencies operate or which are operated for them under contract. Adoption and use of this standard is available to private and commercial organizations.
Applications: A digital signature (ds) algorithm authenticates the integrity of the signed data and the identity of the signatory. A ds algorithm may also be used in proving to a third party that data was actually signed by the generator of the signature. A ds algorithm is intended for use in electronic mail, electronic funds transfer, electronic data interchange, software distribution, data storage, and other applications that require data integrity assurance and data origin authentication. The techniques specified in ANSI X9.31 and ANSI X9.62 may be used in addition to the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) specified herein. (NIST editorial note: either DSA, RSA [ANSI X9.31], or ECDSA [ANSI X9.62] may be used; all three do not have to be implemented.)
Implementations: A ds algorithm may be implemented in software firmware, hardware or any combination thereof. NIST has developed a validation program to test implementations for conformance to DSA. Currently, conformance tests for ANSI X9.31 and ANSI X9.62 have not been developed. These tests will be developed and made available in the future. Information about the planned validation program can be obtained from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory, Attn: DSS Validation, 100 Bureau Drive Stop 8930, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930.
Agencies are advised that separate keys should be used for signature and confidentiality purposes when using the X9.31 standard. This is because the RSA algorithm can be used for both data encryption and digital signature purposes.
Export Control: Certain cryptographic devices and technical data regarding them are subject to Federal export controls. Applicable Federal government export controls are specified in Title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 740.17; Title 15, CFR Part 742; and Title 15, CFR Part 774, Category 5, Part 2.
Patents: The algorithms in this standard may be covered by U.S. or foreign patents.
Implementation Schedule: This standard becomes effective July 27, 2000. A transition period from July 27, 2000 until July 27, 2001 is provided to enable all agencies to develop plans for the acquisition of equipment which implements the digital signature techniques adopted by FIPS 186-2. During the transition period, agencies may continue to use their existing digital signature systems and to acquire additional equipment that may be needed to interoperate with these legacy digital signature systems. Agencies without legacy digital signature systems should plan for the acquisition and use of equipment implementing the digital signature techniques that are adopted by FIPS 186-2. After the transition period, only equipment that implements FIPS 186-2 endorsed techniques should be acquired.
Specifications: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-2 Digital Signature Standard (affixed). Also see an important change notice at the end of this document.
Cross Index:
a. FIPS PUB 46-3, Data Encryption Standard.
b. FIPS PUB 73, Guidelines for Security of Computer Applications.
c. FIPS PUB 140-1, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.
d. FIPS PUB 171, Key Management Using ANSI X9.17.
e. FIPS PUB 180-1, Secure Hash Standard.
f. ANSI X9.31-1998, Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA).
g. ANSI X9.62-1998, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
Qualifications: The security of a digital signature system is dependent on maintaining the secrecy of users' private keys. Users must therefore guard against the unauthorized acquisition of their private keys. While it is the intent of this standard to specify general security requirements for generating digital signatures, conformance to this standard does not assure that a particular implementation is secure. The responsible authority in each agency or department shall assure that an overall implementation provides an acceptable level of security. This standard will be reviewed every five years in order to assess its adequacy.
Waiver Procedure: Under certain exceptional circumstances, the heads of Federal agencies, or their delegates, may approve waivers to Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). The head of such agency may redelegate such authority only to a senior official designated pursuant to section 3506(b) of Title 44, United States Code. Waiver shall be granted only when:
a. Compliance with a standard would adversely affect the accomplishment of the mission of an operator of a Federal computer system; or
b. Cause a major adverse financial impact on the operator which is not offset by Government wide savings.
Agency heads may act upon a written waiver request containing the information detailed above. Agency heads may also act without a written waiver request when they determine that conditions for meeting the standard cannot be met. Agency heads may approve waivers only by a written decision which explains the basis on which the agency head made the required finding(s). A copy of each such decision, with procurement sensitive or classified portions clearly identified, shall be sent to: National Institute of Standards and Technology; ATTN: FIPS Waiver Decisions, 100 Bureau Drive Stop 8970, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8970.
In addition, notice of each waiver granted and each delegation of authority to approve waivers shall be sent promptly to the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and shall be published promptly in the Federal Register.
When the determination on a waiver applies to the procurement of equipment and/or services, a notice of the waiver determination must be published in the Commerce Business Daily as a part of the notice of solicitation for offers of an acquisition or, if the waiver determination is made after that notice is published, by amendment to such notice.
A copy of the waiver, any supporting documents, the document approving the waiver and any supporting and accompanying documents, with such deletions as the agency is authorized and decides to make under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b), shall be part of the procurement documentation and retained by the agency.
Where to Obtain Copies of the Standard: Copies of this publication are for sale by the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, VA 22161. When ordering, refer to Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2 (FIPSPUB186-2), and identify the title. When microfiche is desired, this should be specified. Prices are published by NTIS in current catalogs and other issuances. Payment may be made by check, money order, deposit account or charged to a credit card accepted by NTIS.
Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 186-2
2000 January 27
Specifications for the
DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD (DSS)
1. INTRODUCTION
This publication prescribes three algorithms suitable for digital signature (ds) generation and verification. The first algorithm, the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), is described in sections 4 - 6 and appendices 1 - 5. The second algorithm, the RSA ds algorithm, is discussed in section 7 and the third algorithm, the ECDSA algorithm, is discussed in section 8 and recommended elliptic curves in appendix 6. An important change notice has been appended to this document.
2. GENERAL
When a message is received, the recipient may desire to verify that the message has not been altered in transit. Furthermore, the recipient may wish to be certain of the originator's identity. Both of these services can be provided by a ds algorithm. A digital signature is an electronic analogue of a written signature in that the digital signature can be used in proving to the recipient or a third party that the message was, in fact, signed by the originator. Digital signatures may also be generated for stored data and programs so that the integrity of the data and programs may be verified at any later time.
This publication prescribes two algorithms suitable for digital signature generation and verification.
3. USE OF A DIGITAL SIGNATURE (ds) ALGORITHM
A ds algorithm is used by a signatory to generate a digital signature on data and by a verifier to verify the authenticity of the signature. Each signatory has a public and private key. The private key is used in the signature generation process and the public key is used in the signature verification process. For both signature generation and verification, the data which is referred to as a message, M, is reduced by means of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) specified in FIPS 180-1. An adversary, who does not know the private key of the signatory, cannot generate the correct signature of the signatory. In other words, signatures cannot be forged. However, by using the signatory's public key, anyone can verify a correctly signed message. A means of associating public and private key pairs to the corresponding users is required. That is, there must be a binding of a user's identity and the user's public key. This binding may be certified by a mutually trusted party. For example, a certifying authority could sign credentials containing a user's public key and identity to form a certificate. Systems for certifying credentials and distributing certificates are beyond the scope of this standard. NIST intends to publish separate document(s) on certifying credentials and distributing certificates.
4. DSA PARAMETERS
The DSA makes use of the following parameters:
- p = a prime modulus, where 2L-1 < p < 2L for 512 ≤ L ≤ 1024 and L a multiple of 64
- q = a prime divisor of p - 1, where 2159 < q < 2160
- g = h(p-1)/q mod p, where h is any integer with 1 < h < p - 1 such that h(p-1)/q mod p > 1 (g has order q mod p)
- x = a randomly or pseudorandomly generated integer with 0 < x < q
- y = gx mod p
- k = a randomly or pseudorandomly generated integer with 0 < k < q
The integers p, q, and g can be public and can be common to a group of users. A user's private and public keys are x and y, respectively. They are normally fixed for a period of time. Parameters x and k are used for signature generation only, and must be kept secret. Parameter k must be regenerated for each signature.
Parameters p and q shall be generated as specified in Appendix 2, or using other FIPS approved security methods. Parameters x and k shall be generated as specified in Appendix 3, or using other FIPS approved security methods.
5. DSA SIGNATURE GENERATION
The signature of a message M is the pair of numbers r and's computed according to the equations below:
- r = (gk mod p) mod q and
- s = (k-1(SHA-1(M) + xr)) mod q.
In the above, k-1 is the multiplicative inverse of k, mod q; i.e., (k-1 k) mod q = 1 and 0 < k-1 < q. The value of SHA-1(M) is a 160-bit string output by the Secure Hash Algorithm specified in FIPS 180-1. For use in computing s, this string must be converted to an integer. The conversion rule is given in Appendix 2.2.
As an option, one may wish to check if r = 0 or s = 0. If either r = 0 or s = 0, a new value of k should be generated and the signature should be recalculated (it is extremely unlikely that r = 0 or s = 0 if signatures are generated properly).
The signature is transmitted along with the message to the verifier.
6. DSA SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
Prior to verifying the signature in a signed message, p, q and g plus the sender's public key and identity are made available to the verifier in an authenticated manner.
Let M, r′, and's′ be the received versions of M, r, and s, respectively, and let y be the public key of the signatory. To verify the signature, the verifier first checks to see that 0 < r′ < q and 0 < s′ < q; if either condition is violated the signature shall be rejected. If these two conditions are satisfied, the verifier computes
- w = (s′)-1 mod q
- u1 = ((SHA-1(M′))w) mod q
- u2 = ((r′)w) mod q
- v = (((g)u1 (y)u2) mod p) mod q.
If v = r′, then the signature is verified and the verifier can have high confidence that the received message was sent by the party holding the secret key x corresponding to y. For a proof that v = r′ when M′ = M, r′ = r, and s′ = s, see Appendix 1.
If v does not equal r′, then the message may have been modified, the message may have been incorrectly signed by the signatory, or the message may have been signed by an impostor. The message should be considered invalid.
7. RSA DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM
The RSA ds algorithm is a FIPS approved cryptographic algorithm for digital signature generation and verification. This is described in ANSI X9.31.
8. ELLIPTIC CURVE DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM (ECDSA)
The ECDSA ds algorithm is a FIPS approved cryptographic algorithm for digital signature generation and verification. ECDSA is the elliptic curve analogue of the DSA. ECDSA is described in ANSI X9.62. The recommended elliptic curves for Federal Government use are included in Appendix 6.
APPENDIX 1. A PROOF THAT v = r′ IN THE DSA
This appendix is for informational purposes only and is not required to meet the standard.
The purpose of this appendix is to show that in the DSA, if M′ = M, r′ = r and s′ = s in the signature verification then v = r′. We need the following easy result.
LEMMA. Let p and q be primes so that q divides p - 1, h a positive integer less than p, and g = h(p-1)/q mod p. Then gq mod p = 1, and if m mod q = n mod q, then gm mod p = gn mod p.
Proof: We have
- gq mod p = (h(p-1)/q mod p)q mod p
- = h(p-1) mod p
- = 1
by Fermat's Little Theorem. Now let m mod q = n mod q, i.e., m = n + kq for some integer k. Then
- gm mod p = gn+kq mod p
- = (gn gkq) mod p
- = ((gn mod p) (gq mod p)k) mod p
- = gn mod p
since gq mod p = 1. ∎
We are now ready to prove the main result.
THEOREM. If M′ = M, r′ = r, and s′ = s in the signature verification, then v = r′.
Proof: We have
- w = (s′)-1 mod q = s-1 mod q
- u1 = ((SHA-1(M′))w) mod q = ((SHA-1(M))w) mod q
- u2 = ((r′)w) mod q = (rw) mod q.
Now y = gx mod p, so that by the lemma,
- v = ((gu1 yu2) mod p) mod q
- = ((gSHA-1(M)w yrw) mod p) mod q
- = ((gSHA-1(M)w gxrw) mod p) mod q
- = ((g(SHA-1(M)+xr)w) mod p) mod q.
Also
- s = (k-1(SHA-1(M) + xr)) mod q.
Hence
- w = (k(SHA-1(M) + xr)-1) mod q
- (SHA-1(M) + xr)w mod q = k mod q.
Thus by the lemma,
- v = (gk mod p) mod q
- = r
- = r′. ∎
APPENDIX 2. GENERATION OF PRIMES FOR THE DSA
This appendix includes algorithms for generating the primes p and q used in the DSA. These algorithms require a random number generator (see Appendix 3), and an efficient modular exponentiation algorithm. Generation of p and q shall be performed as specified in this appendix, or using other FIPS approved security methods.
2.1. A PROBABILISTIC PRIMALITY TEST
In order to generate the primes p and q, a primality test is required.
There are several fast probabilistic algorithms available. The following algorithm is a simplified version of a procedure due to M.O. Rabin, based in part on ideas of Gary L. Miller. [See Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, Vol. 2, Addison-Wesley, 1981, Algorithm P, page 379.] If this algorithm is iterated n times, it will produce a false prime with probability no greater than 1/4n. Therefore, n ≥ 50 will give an acceptable probability of error. To test whether an integer is prime:
- Step 1. Set i = 1 and n ≥ 50.
- Step 2. Set w = the integer to be tested, w = 1 + 2am, where m is odd and 2a is the largest power of 2 dividing w - 1.
- Step 3. Generate a random integer b in the range 1 < b < w.
- Step 4. Set j = 0 and z = bm mod w.
- Step 5. If j = 0 and z = 1, or if z = w - 1, go to step 9.
- Step 6. If j > 0 and z = 1, go to step 8.
- Step 7. j = j + 1. If j < a, set z = z2 mod w and go to step 5.
- Step 8. w is not prime. Stop.
- Step 9. If i < n, set i = i + 1 and go to step 3. Otherwise, w is probably prime.
2.2. GENERATION OF PRIMES
The DSA requires two primes, p and q, satisfying the following three conditions:
- 2159 < q < 2160
- 2L-1 < p < 2L for a specified L, where L = 512 + 64j for some 0 ≤ j ≤ 8 c. q divides p - 1. This prime generation scheme starts by using the SHA-1 and a user supplied SEED to construct a prime, q, in the range 2159 < q < 2160. Once this is accomplished, the same SEED value is used to construct an X in the range 2L-1 < X < 2L. The prime, p, is then formed by rounding X to a number congruent to 1 mod 2q as described below. An integer x in the range 0 £ x < 2g may be converted to a g-long sequence of bits by using its binary expansion as shown below: x = x1*2g-1 + x2*2g-2 + ... + xg-1*2 + xg -> { x1,...,xg }. Conversely, a g-long sequence of bits { x1,...,xg } is converted to an integer by the rule { x1,...,xg } -> x1*2g-1 + x2*2g-2 + ... + xg-1*2 + xg. Note that the first bit of a sequence corresponds to the most significant bit of the corresponding integer and the last bit to the least significant bit. Let L - 1 = n*160 + b, where both b and n are integers and 0 £ b < 160. Step 1. Choose an arbitrary sequence of at least 160 bits and call it SEED. Let g be the length of SEED in bits. Step 2. Compute U = SHA-1[SEED] XOR SHA-1[(SEED+1) mod 2g ]. Step 3. Form q from U by setting the most significant bit (the 2159 bit) and the least significant bit to 1. In terms of boolean operations, q = U OR 2159 OR 1. Note that 2159 < q < 2160. Step 4. Use a robust primality testing algorithm to test whether q is prime1. Step 5. If q is not prime, go to step 1. Step 6. Let counter = 0 and offset = 2. Step 7. For k = 0,...,n let Vk = SHA-1[(SEED + offset + k) mod 2g ]. 1 A robust primality test is one where the probability of a non-prime number passing the test is at most 2-80. 14
- Step 8. Let W be the integer
- and let X = W + 2L-1. Note that 0 ≤ W ≤ 2L-1 and hence 2L-1 ≤ X < 2L.
- Step 9. Let c = X mod 2q and set p = X - (c - 1). Note that p is congruent to 1 mod 2q.
- Step 10. If p < 2L-1, then go to step 13.
- Step 11. Perform a robust primality test on p.
- Step 12. If p passes the test performed in step 11, go to step 15.
- Step 13. Let counter = counter + 1 and offset = offset + n + 1.
- Step 14. If counter ≥ 212 = 4096 go to step 1, otherwise (i.e. if counter < 4096) go to step 7.
- Step 15. Save the value of SEED and the value of counter for use in certifying the proper generation of p and q.
- d5014e4b 60ef2ba8 b6211b40 62ba3224 e0427dd3
- bd029bbe 7f51960b cf9edb2b 61f06f0f eb5a38b6
- 67452301 EFCDAB89 98BADCFE 10325476 C3D2E1F0
- 687a66d9 0648f993 867e121f 4ddf9ddb 01205584
- EFCDAB89 98BADCFE 10325476 C3D2E1F0 67452301
- 8df2a494 492276aa 3d25759b b06869cb eac0d83a fb8d0cf7 cbb8324f 0d7882e5 d0762fc5 b7210eaf c2e9adac 32ab7aac
- A prime field is the field GF(p) which contains a prime number p of elements. The elements of this field are the integers modulo p, and the field arithmetic is implemented in terms of the arithmetic of integers modulo p.
- A binary field is the field GF(2m) which contains 2m elements for some m (called the degree of the field). The elements of this field are the bit strings of length m, and the field arithmetic is implemented in terms of operations on the bits.
- A polynomial basis is specified by an irreducible polynomial modulo 2, called the field polynomial. The bit string (am-1 … a2 a1 a0) is taken to represent the polynomial am-1tm-1 + … + a2t2 + a1t + a0
over GF(2). The field arithmetic is implemented as polynomial arithmetic modulo p(t), where p(t) is the field polynomial.
- A normal basis is specified by an element θ of a particular kind. The bit string (a0 a1 a2 … am-1) is taken to represent the element a0θ + a1θ2 + a2θ22 + am-1θ2m-1
Normal basis field arithmetic is not easy to describe or efficient to implement in general, but is for a special class called Type T low-complexity normal bases. For a given field degree m, the choice of T specifies the basis and the field arithmetic (see Appendix 6.2).
- Polynomial Basis: If an irreducible trinomial tm + tk + 1 exists over GF(2), then the field polynomial p(t) is chosen to be the irreducible trinomial with the lowest-degree middle term tk. If no irreducible trinomial exists, then one selects instead a pentanomial tm + ta + tb + tc + 1. The particular pentanomial chosen has the following properties: the second term ta has the lowest degree m; the third term tb has the lowest degree among all irreducible pentanomials of degree m and second term ta; and the fourth term tc has the lowest degree among all irreducible pentanomials of degree m, second term ta, and third term tb.
- Normal Basis: Choose the Type T low-complexity normal basis with the smallest T.
- Pseudo-random curves are those whose coefficients are generated from the output of a seeded cryptographic hash. If the seed value is given along with the coefficients, it can be verified easily that the coefficients were indeed generated by that method.
- Special curves whose coefficients and underlying field have been selected to optimize the efficiency of the elliptic curve operations.
- A pseudo-random curve over GF(p).
- A pseudo-random curve over GF(2m).
- A special curve over GF(2m) called a Koblitz curve or anomalous binary curve.
- The prime modulus p
- The order r
- the 160-bit input seed s to SHA-1 based algorithm
- The output c of the SHA-1 based algorithm
- The coefficient b (satisfying b2 c ≡ -27 (mod p))
- The base point x coordinate Gx
- The base point y coordinate Gy
- The normal basis type T
- The field polynomial (a trinomial or pentanomial)
- The coefficient a
- The base point order r
- The base point x coordinate Gx
- The base point y coordinate Gy
- The base point order r
- The coefficient b
- The base point x coordinate Gx
- The base point y coordinate Gy
- The 160-bit input seed s to the SHA-1 based algorithm
- The coefficient b (i.e., the output of the SHA-1 based algorithm)
- The base point x coordinate Gx
- The base point y coordinate Gy
- Step 1. Choose a new, secret value for the seed-key, XKEY.
- Step 2. In hexadecimal notation let
- This is the initial value for H0 || H1 || H2 || H3 || H4 in the SHS [FIPS 180-1].
APPENDIX 5. EXAMPLE OF THE DSA
This appendix is for informational purposes only and is not required to meet the standard. Let L = 512 (size of p). The values in this example are expressed in hexadecimal notation. The p and q given here were generated by the prime generation standard described in appendix 2 using the 160-bit SEED:
With this SEED, the algorithm found p and q when the counter was at 105. x was generated by the algorithm described in appendix 3, section 3.1, using the SHA-1 to construct G (as in appendix 3, section 3.3) and a 160-bit XKEY: X
KEY =
t =
x = G(t,XKEY) mod q
k was generated by the algorithm described in appendix 3, section 3.2, using the SHA-1 to construct G (as in appendix 3, section 3.3) and a 160-bit KKEY:
KKEY =
t =
k = G(t,KKEY) mod q
Finally:
h = 2
p =
APPENDIX 6. RECOMMENDED ELLIPTIC CURVES FOR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT USE
July 1999
This collection of elliptic curves is recommended for Federal government use and contains choices of private key length and underlying fields.
1. Parameter Choices
1.1 Choice of Key Lengths
The principal parameters for elliptic curve cryptography are the elliptic curve E and a designated point G on E called the base point. The base point has order r, a large prime. The number of points on the curve is n = fr for some integer f (the cofactor) not divisible by r. For efficiency reasons, it is desirable to take the cofactor to be as small as possible.
All of the curves given below have cofactors 1, 2, or 4. As a result, the private and public keys are approximately the same length. Each length is chosen to correspond to the cryptovariable length of a common symmetric cryptologic. In each case, the private key length is, at least, approximately twice the symmetric cryptovariable length.
1.2 Choice of Underlying Fields
For each cryptovariable length, there are given two kinds of fields.
The following table gives the sizes of the various underlying fields. By ||p|| is meant the length of the binary expansion of the integer p.
| Symmetric | Example | ||
| CV Length | Algorithm | Prime Field | Binary Field |
| 80 | SKIPJACK | ||p|| = 192 | m = 163 |
| 112 | Triple-DES | ||p|| = 224 | m = 233 |
| 128 | AES Small | ||p|| = 256 | m = 283 |
| 192 | AES Medium | ||p|| = 384 | m = 409 |
| 256 | AES Large | ||p|| = 521 | m = 571 |
1.3 Choice of Basis
To describe the arithmetic of a binary field, it is first necessary to specify how a bit string is to be interpreted. This is referred to as choosing a basis for the field. There are two common types of bases: a polynomial basis and a normal basis.
There are many polynomial bases and normal bases from which to choose. The following procedures are commonly used to select a basis representation.
For each binary field, the parameters are given for the above basis representations.
1.4 Choice of Curves
Two kinds of curves are given:
For each size, the following curves are given:
The pseudo-random curves are generated via the SHA-1 based method given in the ANSI X9.62 and IEEE P1363 standards. (The generation and verification processes are given in Appendices 6-4 through 6-7.)
1.5 Choice of Base Points
Any point of order r can serve as the base point. Each curve is supplied with a sample base point G = (Gx, Gy). Users may want to generate their own base points to ensure cryptographic separation of networks.
2. Curves over Prime Fields
For each prime p, a pseudo-random curve
of prime order r is listed[1]. (Thus, for these curves, the cofactor is always f = 1.)
The following parameters are given:
The integers p and r are given in decimal form; bit strings and field elements are given in hex.
Curve P-192
Curve P-224
Curve P-256
Curve P-384
Curve P-521
3. Curves over Binary Fields
For each field degree m, a pseudo-random curve is given, along with a Koblitz curve. The pseudo-random curve has the form
E: y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + b,
and the Koblitz curve has the form
Ea: y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + 1
where a = 0 or 1.
For each pseudorandom curve, the cofactor is f = 2. The cofactor of each Koblitz curve is f = 2 if a = 1 and f = 4 if a = 0.
The coefficients of the pseudo-random curves, and the coordinates of the base points of both kinds of curves, are given in terms of both the polynomial and normal basis representations discussed in 1.3.
For each m, the following parameters are given:
Field Representation:
Koblitz Curve:
Pseudo-random curve:
Pseudo-random curve (Polynomial Basis representation):
Pseudo-random curve (Normal Basis representation):
Integers (such as T, m, and r) are given in decimal form; bit strings and field elements are given in hex.
Degree 163 Binary Field
Curve K-163
Polynomial Basis:
Normal Basis:
Curve B-163
Polynomial Basis:
Normal Basis:
Degree 233 Binary Field
Curve K-233
Polynomial Basis:
Normal Basis:
Curve B-233
Polynomial Basis:
Normal Basis:
Degree 283 Binary Field
Curve K-283
Polynomial Basis:
Normal Basis:
Curve B-283
Polynomial Basis:
Normal Basis:
Degree 409 Binary Field
Curve K-409
Polynomial Basis:
Normal Basis:
Curve B-409
Polynomial Basis:
Normal Basis:
Degree 571 Binary Field
Curve K-571
Polynomial Basis:
Normal Basis:
APPENDIX 6.1: IMPLEMENTATION OF MODULAR ARITHMETIC
The prime moduli in the above examples are of a special type (called generalized Mersenne numbers) for which modular multiplication can be carried out more efficiently than in general. This appendix provides the rules for implementing this faster arithmetic, for each of the prime moduli appearing in the examples.
The usual way to multiply two integers (mod m) is to take the integer product and reduce it (mod m). One therefore has the following problem: given an integer A less than m2, compute
In general, one must obtain B as the remainder of an integer division. If m is a generalized Mersenne number, however, then B can be expressed as a sum or difference (mod m) of a small number of terms. To compute this expression, one can evaluate the integer sum or difference and reduce the result modulo m. The latter reduction can be accomplished by adding or subtracting a few copies of m.
The prime moduli p for each of the five example curves is a generalized Mersenne number.
Curve P-192: The modulus for this curve is p = 2 192 - 2 64 - 1. Every integer A less than p2 can be written A = A5 � 2320 + A4 � 2256 + A3 � 2192 + A2 � 2128 + A1 � 264 + A0, where each Ai is a 64-bit integer. The expression for B is B := T + S1 + S2 + S3 mod p; where the 192-bit terms are given by T = A2 � 2128 + A1 � 264 + A0 S1 =
A3 � 264 + A3
S2 = A4 � 2128 + A4 � 264
S3 = A5 � 2128 + A5 � 264 + A5.
50 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/54 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/55 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/56 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/57 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/58 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/59 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/60 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/61 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/62 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/63 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/64 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/65 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/66 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/67 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/68 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/69 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/70 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/71 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/72 Page:Fips186-2-change1.pdf/73 FIPS 186-2, DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD
CHANGE NOTICE 1
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
DATE OF CHANGE: 2001 October 5
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-2, Digital Signature Standard, specifies the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) that may be used in the generation and verification of digital signatures for sensitive, unclassified applications. FIPS 186-2 also allows the use of the digital signature techniques specified in American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X9.31 (Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA)) and ANSI X9.62 (Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)). The standard also specifies a transition period for the use of existing (legacy) digital signature systems. Reversible public key algorithms, such as the RSA or Rabin-Williams algorithms, are often used in these legacy systems.
FIPS 186-2 is used in conjunction with the hash function specified in FIPS 180-1, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), and includes specifications for the size of the prime modulus p, and algorithms for the generation of a user's private key, x, and a user's per message secret number, k.
This change notice provides changes for the continued use of DSA as specified in FIPS 186-2 about the size of the prime modulus p, modifications for the random number generation techniques specified in Appendix 3 of FIPS 186-2, and provides instructions for the use of these techniques when used in contexts other than the generation of DSA keys. This change notice also provides guidance for the use of the reversible public key algorithms within legacy systems.
Questions regarding this change notice may be directed to FIPS186@nist.gov or to Elaine Barker (ebarker@nist.gov, 301-975-2911).
The Size of the Prime Modulus
Section 4 of FIPS 186-2 specifies that the prime modulus p of DSA is defined for the range of prime integers 2L-1 < p < 2L, where 512 ≤ L ≤ 1024 and L is a multiple of 64. This change notice specifies that L should assume only the value 1024 for DSA as specified in FIPS 186-2, i.e., the prime modulus p should be defined in the range 21023 < p < 21024.
The RSA and Rabin-Williams algorithms used within legacy systems are defined with a modulus n and prime factors p and q of n. This change notice specifies that n should be at least 1024 bits in length, and p and q should be approximately half the size of n in bits.
Random Number Generation
FIPS 186-2 includes algorithms for the generation of a user's private key, x, and a user's per message secret number, k. These values must be generated randomly or pseudorandomly and must have values between 0 and the 160-bit prime q (as specified in the standard). Techniques for generating x and k are provided in Appendix 3 of the standard.
Recently, an unpublished attack on DSA[2] was found that relies on the non-uniformity of the pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) specified in Appendix 3 of the standard. The attack has a workfactor of 264 and requires 222 known signatures. This attack can be defended against by either limiting the number of signatures created using a specific key pair to no more than 2 million signatures while using the PRNGs specified in FIPS 186-2, or by modifying the PRNGs.
If the PRNGs currently defined in FIPS 186-2 are used, the user should be provided with clear guidance about the limitation to the number of signatures that should be created.
Alternatively, the following modifications of the PRNGs may be used in lieu of those PRNGs specified in FIPS 186-2. These modifications reduce the non-uniformity of the PRNGs and do not affect interoperability.
The two algorithms described below use a one-way function G(t,c), where t is 160 bits, c is b bits and G(t,c) is 160 bits. Two methods for constructing G are defined in FIPS 186-2: using SHA-1 as defined in FIPS 180-1, and using the Data Encryption Standard (DES) as defined in FIPS 46-3. If G is constructed using SHA-1, b is between 160 and 512 bits (160 ≤ b ≤ 512); if G is constructed using DES, b is equal to 160 bits.
1. Revised Algorithm for Computing m values of x (Appendix 3.1 of FIPS 186-2)
Let x be the signer's private key. The following may be used to generate m values of x:
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_____________________
- ↑ The selection a = -3 for the coefficient of x was made for reasons of efficiency; see IEEE P1363.
- ↑ The attack was discovered by Dr. Daniel Bliechenbacher of Lucent Technologies, Bell Labs, Murray Hill, NJ. See a February 25, 2001 press article at http://www.lucent.com/press/0201/010205.bla.html.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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