History of the United States During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson/Second/II:8

by Henry Adams

Chapter 8: The Mission of George Rose

December 22 Jefferson signed the Embargo Act; four days afterward George Rose arrived at Norfolk. The avowed object of his mission was to offer satisfaction for the attack upon the "Chesapeake;" the true object could be seen only in the instructions with which he was furnished by Canning.^[1]

These instructions, never yet published, began by directing that in case any attempt should be made to apply the President's proclamation of July 2 to Rose's frigate, the "Statira," he should make a formal protest, and if the answer of the American government should be unsatisfactory, or unreasonably delayed, he should forthwith return to England. Should no such difficulty occur, he was on arriving at Washington to request an audience of the President and Secretary of State, and to announce himself furnished with full powers to enter into negotiation on the "Chesapeake" affair, but forbidden to entertain any proposition on any other point.

"With respect to that object, you will express your conviction that the instructions under which you act would enable you to terminate your negotiation amicably and satisfactorily. But you will state that you are distinctly instructed, previously to entering into any negotiation, to require the recall of the proclamation of the President of the United States, and the discontinuance of the measures which have been adopted under it."

After explaining that the disavowal and recall of Admiral Berkeley had taken away the excuse for interdicting free communication with British ships, and that thenceforward the interdict became an aggression, Canning directed that if the request be refused, Rose should declare his mission at an end; but supposing the demand to be satisfied, he was to disavow at once the forcible attack on the "Chesapeake."

"You will state further that Admiral Berkeley has been recalled from his command for having acted in an affair of such importance without authority. You will add that his Majesty is prepared to discharge those men who were taken by this unauthorized act out of the American frigate; reserving to himself the right of reclaiming such of them as shall prove to have been deserters from his Majesty's service, or natural-born subjects of his Majesty; and further, that in order to repair as far as possible the consequences of an act which his Majesty disavows, his Majesty is ready to secure to the widows and orphans (if such there be) of such of the men who were unfortunately killed on board the 'Chesapeake' as shall be proved not to have been British subjects, a provision adequate to their respective situation and condition in life."

This disavowal, and the removal of Berkeley from command, were to be the limit of concession. The circumstances of provocation under which Berkeley had acted, greatly extenuated his procedure; "and his Majesty therefore commands me to instruct you peremptorily to reject any further mark of his Majesty's displeasure toward Admiral Berkeley."

The remainder of Canning's instructions admits of no abridgment:—

"You will next proceed to state that after this voluntary offer of reparation on his Majesty's part, his Majesty expects that the Government of the United States will be equally ready to remove those causes of just complaint which have led to this unfortunate transaction.

"His Majesty requires this, not only as a due return for the reparation which he has thus voluntarily tendered, but as indispensable to any well-founded expectation of the restoration and continuance of that harmony and good understanding between the two governments which it is equally the interest of both to cultivate and improve.

"However much his Majesty may regret the summary mode of redress which has been resorted to in the present instance, it cannot be supposed that his Majesty is prepared to acquiesce in an injury so grievous to his Majesty as the encouragement of desertion from his naval service.

"The extent to which this practice has been carried is too notorious to require illustration; but the instance of the 'Chesapeake' itself is sufficient to justify the demand of adequate satisfaction.

"The protestation of Commodore Barron is contradicted in the face of the world by the conviction and confession of one of those unhappy men who had been seduced from his allegiance to his Majesty, and to whom Commodore Barron had promised his protection.

"His Majesty, however, does not require any proceeding of severity against Commodore Barron; but he requires a formal disavowal of that officer's conduct in encouraging deserters from his Majesty's service, in retaining them on board his ship, and in denying the fact of their being there; and he requires that this disavowal shall be such as plainly to show that the American government did not countenance such proceedings, and to deter any officer in their service from similar misconduct in future.

"He requires a disavowal of other flagrant proceedings,—detailed in papers which have been communicated to you,—unauthorized, his Majesty has no doubt, but with respect to which it ought to be known to the world that the American government did not authorize and does not approve them.

"You will state that such disavowals, solemnly expressed, would afford to his Majesty a satisfactory pledge on the part of the American government that the recurrence of similar causes will not on any occasion impose on his Majesty the necessity of authorizing those means of force to which Admiral Berkeley has resorted without authority, but which the continued repetition of such provocations as unfortunately led to the attack upon the 'Chesapeake' might render necessary, as a just reprisal on the part of his Majesty.

"And you will observe, therefore, that if the American government is animated by an equally sincere desire with that which his Majesty entertains to preserve the relations of peace between the two countries from being violated by the repetition of such transactions, they can have no difficulty in consenting to make these disavowals.

"This consent is to be the express and indispensable condition of your agreeing to reduce into an authentic and official form the particulars of the reparation which you are instructed to offer,"

Rose came, not to conciliate, but to terrify. His apology was a menace. So little was the President prepared for such severity, that from the moment of his consent to treat the "Chesapeake" affair by itself he rather regarded the mission and reparation as a formality. So completely had Monroe been beguiled by Canning's courteous manners, that no suspicion of the truth crossed his mind or crept into his despatches. No prominent American, except Giles, ventured to hint that this mission of peace and friendship was intended only to repeat the assertion of supremacy which had led to the original offence.

George Henry Rose was chiefly remembered as the father of Lord Strathnairn; but his merits were quite different from those of his son. Without the roughness which sometimes marked English character, Rose's manners betrayed a dignified and slightly patronizing courteousness,—a certain civil condescension,—impressive to Americans of that day, who rarely felt at ease in the presence of an Englishman, or were quite certain that an American gentleman knew the habits of European society. Benevolent superiority and quiet assumption, so studied as to be natural and simple, were the social weapons with which George Rose was to impose an unparalleled indignity on a government which, in professing contempt for forms, invited discourtesies. No man could have been chosen with qualities better suited for enforcing Canning's will on the yielding moods of Jefferson.

Rose's first act after arriving in Hampton Roads was to notify the President that he could not land until assured that the proclamation of July 2 would not be enforced against his ship. Canning had been already officially informed that the proclamation expressly excepted vessels on a service like that of the "Statira," as he might have seen for himself by a moment's inquiry; but his instructions were written to suit the temper of Tory constituents. Rose was obliged to wait from December 26 until January 9 before leaving his ship, while messengers carried explanations and notes between Norfolk and Washington.

Monroe, who sailed from England a day later than Rose, reached Washington December 22. Rose arrived only January 14. January 16 he was received by the President, and made no complaint of the mode of reception. In the four years that had passed since Merry's arrival, Jefferson had learned to be less strict in Republican etiquette; but although Rose suffered no indignity at the White House, he found much to disapprove in the government. January 17, in a despatch to Canning, he mentioned that Congress contained one tailor, one weaver, six or seven tavern-keepers, four notorious swindlers, one butcher, one grazier, one curer of hams, and several schoolmasters and Baptist preachers.^[2]

The most aristocratic American of the twentieth century will probably agree with the most extreme socialist in admitting that Congress, in 1808, might with advantage have doubled its proportion of tailors, butchers, and swindlers, if by doing so it could have lessened the number of its conspirators. To the latter class belonged Senator Pickering, whose power for mischief and whose appetite for intrigue combined to make him a valuable ally for Rose. Within forty-eight hours after Rose's arrival, the senator from Massachusetts had fallen under the fascination of the British envoy's manners and conversation. January 18 he wrote to his nephew Timothy Williams,^[3]—

"I now take up my pen merely to mention an unexpected interview with Mr. Rose. I met him last Saturday [January 16] at Georgetown, at the table of Mr. Peter, whose lovely wife is a granddaughter of Mrs. Washington. Mr. Rose's face is indicative of a placid temper, and his conversation confirms it. He possesses good sense and a disposition perfectly conciliatory. Such also is the disposition of the minister, Canning, by whom he was selected for this mission. Canning was his school-fellow and intimate friend. It seemed to me a sort of friendly compulsion that sent him hither. It was a sacrifice for a domestic man who left a wife and seven children behind him, and from whom he had never before been separated. Thus much I gathered from his conversation with me, which was marked with ease and candor; indeed with singular openness, as if I had been an old acquaintance. He expressed his surprise that the real state of the negotiation with Mr. Monroe had not become officially known to the people by an open communication to Congress. No minister of Great Britain, he observed, would have used such concealment as existed here. He manifested a solicitude even to anxiety for a pacific adjustment of all our differences. What our Government will demand as a reparation for the attack on the 'Chesapeake' I do not know, nor what Mr. Rose is authorized to concede; but I run no hazard in saying that nothing in reality will be denied, and that if after all a war with England should ensue, the fault will be our own."

In giving this account of Rose's singular openness and candor, Senator Pickering did not repeat his own remarks in the conversation; but they could be inferred from the rest of his letter.

"I wrote last week to Mr. Cabot that I had the best authority for saying that our Government had abandoned the ground taken in London,—to treat of the 'Chesapeake' affair only in connection with the old subjects of dispute. They have now determined to negotiate on this separately, and even say that it is an affair by itself and ought to be so treated. Perhaps they may demand that Admiral Berkeley be brought to a British court-martial,—that at any rate he be removed from command; and that the three rascals of deserters who remain unhung should be restored.

"Confidence now seems to be in Mr. Jefferson's hands as effectual in producing a compliance with his recommendations as soldiers in the hands of Bonaparte in procuring submission to his commands. With the like implicit, blind confidence which enacted the Embargo, the legislatures of Virginia and Maryland have approved it. To this day if you ask any member of Congress the cause and the object of the Embargo, he can give no answer which common-sense does not spurn at. I have reason to believe that Mr. Jefferson expected to get some credit for it by having it ready just in time to meet the retaliating order of England for Napoleon's decree of Nov. 21, 1806. With much solicitude he, two or three weeks ago, expressed his wonder that it did not arrive, apparently desiring it as a material justification with the people for the Embargo. He will doubtless be utterly disappointed."

That Jefferson in recommending the Embargo had the Orders in Council in his mind was therefore known to Pickering,^[4] and was the general talk of Federalists in Washington during the month which followed the Embargo Act; but the orders themselves reached America only the day after this letter was written, and were published in the "National Intelligencer" of January 22. In full view of the official command that American trade with Europe should pass through British ports and pay duty to the British Treasury, doubt as to the wisdom of an Embargo seemed at an end. No further dispute appeared possible except on the question whether or when the Embargo should be raised in order to declare war. Already, January 11, Senator Adams offered a Resolution for appointing a committee to consider and report when the Embargo could be taken off and vessels permitted to arm; but the Senate silently rejected the Resolution, January 21, by a vote of seventeen to ten.^[5] Neither decision nor debate on so serious a point could be profitably undertaken before the result of Rose's diplomacy should be revealed.

Saturday, January 16, before meeting Senator Pickering at dinner, Rose had delicately explained to Madison that the President's "Chesapeake" proclamation was likely to prove a stumbling-block. In conversations which consumed another week he urged its withdrawal, while Madison replied that the exclusion of British ships was not a punishment but a precaution, that the "Leopard's" attack was but one of its causes, and that it was a measure taken in the interests of peace. Argument against Canning's positive instructions answered no purpose. Rose could not give way, and when he had been one week in Washington, January 21, the negotiation was already at a stand-still. There it would under any other Administration have been permitted to remain. Rose had come to offer an apology and to restore the captured seamen. He had only to do this and go home.

Rose, after an interview with the Secretary of State about January 21, waited until January 27 before writing to Canning. Then he resumed his story:^[6]—

"Within a few hours after my last conference with Mr. Madison, an indirect and confidential communication was made to me from one of the members of the Government to the following purport: that the real difficulty as to the recall of the proclamation was that of finding grounds upon which the President could found his declared motives for such a measure without exposing himself to the charge of inconsistency and disregard of the national honor, and without compromising his own personal weight in the State; that it was earnestly wished that I could make, as it were, a bridge over which he might pass; and that I would develop just so much of the tenor of my instructions as to the conditions of reparation as might justify him in the course which I required should be taken; that should however this be impossible, and should the negotiation fail, the United States would not commence war with Great Britain, but would continue their Embargo, and adopting a sort of Chinese policy would shut themselves up from the rest of the world; that if we attacked them they would sally out just far enough to repel us, and would invade Canada.... Communications of a similar nature were repeated to me on subsequent days; and it did not seem advisable to address Mr. Madison in writing until the utmost point to which they would go was ascertained. At length I had a conversation with the gentleman in question. He avowed to me that what had passed was with the knowledge of the President, whose difficulty arose from the sacrifice of public opinion which he apprehended must follow from the abandonment of the proclamation. He said I must be aware how dear to Mr. Jefferson his popularity must be, and especially at the close of his political career, and that this consideration must be held particularly in view by him; and he pressed me earnestly to take such steps as would conciliate the President's wish to give his Majesty satisfaction on the point in question and yet to maintain the possession of what was pre-eminently valuable to him. He expressed his own personal anxiety for the accommodation of the present difference,—an anxiety heightened by his knowledge that the United States had forever lost all hope of obtaining the Floridas, the negotiation for them having totally failed, and by his intimate persuasion that France is the dormant owner of them. He said, moreover, that since America could not obtain those provinces, he sincerely wished to see them in the hands of Great Britain, whose possession of them could never be anxious to the United States."

The supplications of this Cabinet minister were reinforced by entreaties from leading Federalists, who begged Rose not to follow a course which would aid the President in rousing popular feeling against England; but the British envoy could yield only so far as not to break the negotiation abruptly. January 26 he wrote to the Secretary a note, in courteous language announcing himself authorized to express the conviction which he certainly could not have felt that if the proclamation were withdrawn, he should be able "to terminate the negotiation amicably and satisfactorily." Madison sent no answer to the note, but kept the negotiation alive by private interviews. January 29 Rose suggested the idea of his friendly return to England with a representation of the difficulty. Madison reported this suggestion to the President, who on the following Monday, February 1, decided against the idea, preferring to yield the point of dignity so far as to offer a recall of the proclamation, conditional upon an informal disclosure by Rose of the terms in which the atonement would be made.^[7]

Throughout this tortuous affair Rose stood impassive. He made no advance, offered no suggestion of aid, showed no anxiety. Republicans and Federalists crowded about him with entreaties and advice. Rose listened in silence. Amateur diplomacy never showed its evils more plainly than in the negotiation with Rose; and when Madison allowed the President to take the affair into his own hands, employing another Cabinet officer to do what no Secretary of State could permit himself to undertake, the nuisance became a scandal. In the despatch of January 27 Rose concealed the name of the deputy Secretary of State; but in a despatch of February 6 he revealed it:—

"I should here add that a member of the Cabinet (the Secretary of the Navy), who informed me that all his communications with me were with the President's knowledge, assures me that a rupture with France is inevitable and at hand."

That Robert Smith acted in the matter as negotiator for the President was afterward made known by Jefferson himself.^[8]

Jefferson clung with touching pathos to the love and respect of his fellow-citizens, who repaid his devotion with equal attachment; but many an American President who yearned no less passionately for the people's regard would have died an outcast rather than have trafficked in their dignity and his own self-respect in order to seek or save a personal popularity. Perhaps Jefferson never knew precisely what was said of him by his Secretary of the Navy,—a passing remark by such a man as Robert Smith, repeated through such a medium as George Rose, need count for little; but the truth must be admitted that in 1808—for the first and probably for the last time in history—a President of the United States begged for mercy from a British minister.

In obedience to the President's decision, Madison yielded to the British demand on condition that the Executive should not be exposed to the appearance of having yielded.^[9] He arranged with Rose the "bridge" which Robert Smith had previously prepared for the President to cross. In a "secret and confidential" despatch dated Feb. 6, 1808, Rose explained to Canning, with evident uneasiness, the nature of the new proposal:^[10]—

"The proposition made to me by Mr. Madison at the close of our conference of yesterday was that he should put into my hands a proclamation recalling the original proclamation, sealed and signed by the President, bearing date on the day of adjustment of differences, and conceived in such terms as I should agree to; that on this being done we should proceed to sign the instruments adjusting the reparation. I answered that positive as my instructions were to the effect I had invariably stated to him, such was the knowledge I had of the disposition of his Majesty's government to act with the utmost conciliation toward this country that I would attempt the experiment, but premising distinctly that it must be made unofficially through the whole of it, and with the assurance of our mutual good faith to that effect; and that as it must be completely and essentially informal,—for the purpose of getting over difficulties which appeared insuperable in any other way,—it must be distinctly understood that if the attempt failed, the regular and official communication must be resumed on my explanatory note of January 26, and on that alone."

In the defence which Rose offered for thus disregarding his instructions, the cause of his embarrassment was plain. Duty required him to act as though England had hitherto endured with magnanimity the wrongs inflicted by America, but might find herself obliged soon to resent them. This attitude could have been maintained against ordinary forms of diplomacy, but Rose found himself stifled in the embraces of men whose hatred was necessary to warrant his instructions. He would gladly have assumed that Madison's concessions and Robert Smith's cajoleries were treacherous; but his Federalist friends, whose interests were actively English, assured him that if America could avoid a war with England, she would inevitably drift into a war with France. The temptation to show equal courtesy to that which was shown to him, the instinctive shrinking from a harsh act, the impossibility of obeying instructions without putting himself in the wrong, and finally perhaps an incapacity to understand the full humiliation implied in his unrevealed demands, led him to give way, and to let Madison, partially into the secret of Canning's instructions.

On the evening of February 5 Rose and Erskine went to the house of the Secretary, and a draft of the proposed proclamation was there offered to them and accepted. The next day, at the Department, Rose delicately began to reveal the further disavowals he was instructed to demand. Even then he seemed ashamed to betray the whole, but delayed and discussed, knowing that he had done too much or too little for the objects of his mission. Not until after repeated interviews did he at last, February 14, mention "with an apology for omitting it before, when he intended to do it," that a disavowal of Commodore Barron would be required.^[11]

So cautious was Madison on his side that he offered to make a part of the required disavowals, provided these should be mutual. Rose declined this offer, but proposed nothing more, and seemed rather to invite a friendly failure of agreement. He ended the conversation of February 14 by addressing to Madison the usual words of rupture: "I will not dissemble that I leave you with the most painful impressions."^[12] February 16 Madison closed these informal interviews with the dry remark that the United States could not be expected to "make as it were an expiatory sacrifice to obtain redress, or beg for reparation." ^[13]

The delay had strengthened Rose by weakening the President. The embargo was beginning to work. That the people should long submit to it was impossible, reported Rose; even North Carolina was turning against it. Monroe's influence made itself felt.

"I learn this day," wrote the British envoy February 17, "that Mr. Monroe has been indefatigable in representing through Virginia the contrasted systems of Great Britain and France in their true lights, the certain destruction which must result to America from the prevalence of the latter, and the necessity of uniting for existence with the former. He has undoubtedly acquired a very strong party in that State,—it is now said a decided majority in its legislature, and one entirely brought over to the views above enounced."

February 22, only a few days after the rupture of negotiation, the Milan Decree arrived, and was published in the "National Intelligencer." This violent act of Napoleon did much to divert popular indignation from England. Under the influence of this good fortune, Rose so little feared war as a consequence of his failure that he speculated rather as to the policy of accepting the United States as an ally:

"It would certainly be highly desirable," he wrote,^[14] "that a rupture between France and America should take place; but the latter under its present Constitution and Administration could take but a very feeble part in the warfare, and I know not if it is to be wished that it should be roused to greater exertions, which must lead to a more efficient form of government, a knowledge of its strength, and the development of extensive views of ambition."

Nothing remained but to revert to Rose's note of January 26, and to close the affair by a formal correspondence. No further attempt was made to conciliate the British envoy, or to obtain concessions from him; but February 24 he was told by Madison of two steps to be taken by the Government which bore on his negotiation. The President would recommend to Congress an increase of the army to ten thousand men, and a levy of twenty-four thousand volunteers. Madison added that these were to be considered as "measures of preparation, but not as leading to war, or as directed against any particular nation." The Secretary added that an order had been issued to discharge all British subjects from national ships,—"an act of complaisance in its effects which he observed Great Britain could lay no claim to; which was done gratuitously, but from views of policy and fitness entertained by this Government."

March 5 Madison at last sent his reply to Rose's note of January 26. After repeating the reasons which forbade a withdrawal of the President's proclamation, the Secretary closed by informing Rose that the President "has authorized me, in the event of your disclosing the terms of reparation which you believe will be satisfactory, and on its appearing that they are so, . . . to proceed to concert with you a revocation of that act.^[15] Rose waited till March 17, as though hoping for some further overture, but finally replied, "It is with the most painful sensations of regret that I find myself . . . under the necessity of declining to enter into the terms of negotiation which by direction of the President you therein offer."^[16]

Rose's professions of regret were doubtless sincere. Apart from the wish felt by every young diplomatist to avoid the appearance of failure, Rose could not but see that his Government must wish to be relieved of the three American seamen imprisoned at Halifax, whose detention, admitted to be an act of violence, must become a festering sore in the relations of the two countries. That the American government meant to profit by it was evident. By leaving the "Chesapeake" affair unsettled, Rose played into the hands of a national party. For the first time since 1794 language began to be used to a British minister in the United States which he could not hear without loss of dignity or sense of discredit. The word "war" was semi-officially pronounced.

When on Monday, March 21, Rose made his parting visits, he found the President silent; the Secretary of State studiously avoided all political topics, while if Rose's report was accurate, Gallatin and Robert Smith talked with intentional freedom.

"Mr. Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, has little influence in the Government, though by far the ablest and best informed member of it; and he probably does not interfere materially beyond the limits of his own department; but his utility in that department, in which no adequate successor to him is contemplated, is such that, as they feel they cannot do without him, they are anxious to retain him at the head of it, and consequently are obliged to keep him informed of their proceedings. . . . Mr. Gallatin said at once and spontaneously that nothing of real difficulty remained between the two countries but his Majesty's Orders in Council. This he repeated twice, dwelling upon the word 'nothing' with particular emphasis. He added that if the belligerent Powers persisted in enforcing their restrictions on the neutral commerce, the embargo must be continued until the end of the year, and that then America must take part in the war; that England had officially declared that she would revoke the restrictions she had imposed if her enemy would do the same; but that though France had professed as much, she had neither done it to the minister of the United States at Paris nor directly to this Government; neither had she made any communication to it of her restrictive edicts, or relative to them; and that this Government felt sensibly the difference of the conduct held toward it by those of Great Britain and France in those respects."^[17]

Gallatin's assertion that if the Orders in Council were enforced America within a year must declare war, went far beyond any threat ever made before by President Jefferson or his party. The Secretary of the Navy held a somewhat different tone:—

"Mr. Smith told me that all would remain quiet if no new vexations were committed on their coast, and that the only measure which the Government would carry into effect would be the levy of the body of regulars to consist nominally of six thousand, but really of four thousand men."

Senator Giles and other Republican leaders avowed readiness for war with England. Before Rose's departure, the new policy had become defined. Its first object was to unite America in resisting England and France; the second, to maintain the embargo till the country should be ready for war.

With these ends in view, the Administration threw aside the "Chesapeake" affair as a matter which concerned England rather than America. Madison notified Erskine that the subject had lost its consequence, and that if England wished a settlement she must seek it.

"It will throw some light upon the views of this Government," wrote Rose in his last despatch,^[18] "if I state that in a recent conversation with Mr. Erskine, Mr. Madison observed that since England has thus publicly disclaimed the right of search of national ships for deserters, and Admiral Berkeley has been recalled from command of the Halifax squadron, although a more formal mode of terminating the business would have been more acceptable to this Government, it would consider itself as satisfied on the restoration of the seamen taken away by an act of force disavowed by his Majesty; but that it would not again ask for reparation upon this matter."

From that moment all eyes turned toward the embargo. The President had chosen his ground. Unless his experiment succeeded, he might yet be forced into the alternative of a second submission or war.

References

1. Instructions to G. H. Rose, Oct. 24, 1807; MSS. British Archives.
2. Rose to Canning, Jan. 17, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
3. Pickering to T. Williams, Jan. 18, 1808; Pickering MSS.
4. Cf. Letters addressed to the People of the United States, by Col. Timothy Pickering. London (reprinted), 1811. Letter xiii. p. 96. Review of Cunningham Correspondence, by Timothy Pickering (Salem, 1824), pp. 56-58.
5. Diary of J. Q. Adams, i. 504.
6. Rose to Canning, Jan. 27, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
7. Negotiations with Mr. Rose; Madison's Works, ii. 411.
8. Jefferson to W. Wirt, May 2, 1811; Works, v. 593.
9. Negotiations with Mr. Rose, Feb. 4, 1808; Madison's Works, ii. 12.
10. Rose to Canning, Feb. 6, 1808; MSS. British Archives. Cf. Madison's Writings, ii. 413.
11. Madison's Writings, ii. 416.
12. Rose to Canning, Feb. 16, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
13. Rose to Canning, Feb. 17, 1808; MSS. British Archives
14. Rose to Canning, Feb. 27, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
15. Madison to Rose, March 5, 1808; State Papers, iii. 214.
16. Rose to Madison, March 17, 1808; State Papers, iii. 217.
17. Rose to Canning, March 22, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
18. Rose to Canning, March 22, 1808; MSS. British Archives. Cf. Madison to Pinckney, April 4, 1808; State Papers, iii. 221.