over in silence. Each of these theories has been maintained by eminent philosophers, and a line or two must be devoted to stating and criticising them.
The first view is that at which we glanced at the beginning of the chapter. The theory that conscience is a separate faculty of the mind was strongly defended by Bishop Butler, one of the most honoured names in the history of English Ethics. Butler says that conscience is a faculty of peculiar sanctity, in kind and nature supreme over all others. This faculty, which is purely rational, has absolute and unquestioned authority. It passes judgment both on the man and his actions. It pronounces without the possibility of error, and without the possibility of appeal, that some actions are in themselves right, just, and good, and that others are in themselves evil, wrong, and unjust. It is a "magisterial faculty," whose prerogative it is to judge and govern, with perfect impartiality and perfect authority.
Now, in answer to this, we must point out (a) that psychology has now established that there are no separate and distinct faculties of the mind, and therefore an isolated moral faculty or conscience is simply a fiction. (b) The peculiar "sanctity" of conscience comes, not from conscience itself, but from the kind of objects with which the self is concerned in making moral judgments. Moral judgments are made with regard to the good and duty, and it is these which have a special sanctity.
According to the other view, conscience is simply a group of instincts, or a collection of emotions, or
